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The paper presents real per capita GDP growth forecasts for all developing countries for 
the period 2005-14. For 55 of these countries, representing major world regions and 
accounting for close to 80% of the developing world’s GDP, the paper forecasts the 
growth effects of the main forces underpinning growth assuming that these evolve 
following past trends. We find that for the average developing country the largest growth 
dividend comes from continued improvement in public infrastructure, followed by the 
growth contributions of rising secondary school enrollment, trade openness, and financial 
deepening. The joint contribution of these four growth determinants to average, annual 
per capita GDP growth in the next decade is estimated to be 1 percentage point. Failure to 
keep improving public infrastructure alone could reduce this growth dividend by 50 
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The paper forecasts growth trends in the developing world, and for a large sample of 
countries, identifies the main forces likely to underpin growth in the period 2005-14. The 
paper presents real per capita GDP growth forecasts for all developing countries for the next 
ten year period. For 55 of these countries,
1 representing all major world regions except 
Europe and Central Asia and accounting for close to 80% of the developing world’s GDP, the 
paper presents real per capita GDP growth forecasts that reflect the growth effects of various 
growth determinants assuming that these evolve following past trends.  
The forecasting exercise contributes to the literature a collection of econometrically 
derived country forecasts of real per capita GDP growth for the next decade and all 
developing countries in the world. Such forecasts are often an input into various types of 
economic sector work – from debt sustainability analysis to scenario building for 
macroeconomic and policy modeling exercises, and we could not find a set of growth 
forecasts of this kind in the literature. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook, the World Bank’s 
Unified Surveys and CAS documents publish country growth forecasts for only the next 3 to 5 
years, while the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects report presents growth forecasts at 
the regional, not the country level. 
Our analysis, based on a cross country regression framework, suggests that for the 
average developing country the growth effects of continued improvements in public 
infrastructure will be larger than those of improved secondary school enrollment, trade 
openness, and financial deepening. The joint contribution of increases in these growth factors 
to average, annual real per capita GDP growth in the developing world in the next decade is 
                                                 
1 We focused on the group of fifty five developing countries, which jointly with twenty three developed 
countries, is a part of the panel data used by Loayza et al. (2005) to estimate the cross-country growth model 
employed in this study. The rest of the developing countries were not part of the panel data because of missing 
data on real per capita GDP growth. The bulk of the excluded countries are transition economies, countries that 
did not exist during the sample period, and very small developing economies.   3
estimated to be 1 percentage point. Half of this increase is due to the anticipated 
improvements in public infrastructure.  
The forecasts presented in this paper should not be interpreted as predictions but as 
estimates of economic growth possibilities given a set of assumptions that may not reflect 
accurately economic conditions in some developing countries and/or may change in the 
future. The modeling framework can be used as a simulation tool to assess, based on historical 
averages, how much growth in a country may be affected by changes in the growth indicators 
included in the model. However, it is important to keep in mind that the tool uses proxies for 
growth determinants, and changes in these should not be interpreted literally. For instance, 
although the model uses main phone lines as a proxy for public infrastructure, investment in 
main phone lines alone will not lead to growth. The value of this type of exercise is in the 
discipline it generates in obtaining the forecasts and the possibilities it presents for scenario 
analysis.  
We acknowledge that the quality of the growth forecasts depends on the correct 
specification of the econometric model, the accuracy and future stability of the estimated 
regression coefficients, and the quality of the forecasts of all explanatory variables. Hence, we 
have outlined carefully all the assumptions made to produce the growth forecasts and have 
tested extensively the sensitivity of these forecasts to the model specification and the time 
horizon of the estimation procedure. Given all this the forecasts presented in this paper should 
be used together with other pertinent country specific information, such as rigorous analysis 
of the growth prospects of individual industries and country specific circumstances, to form 
consensus growth forecasts.  
We would like to emphasize that the forecasting model is not a tool that can guide 
country policy design. Since the cross-country framework used in this paper does not capture 
policy interactions, does not allow us to sequence policy reforms, identify binding constraints   4
to growth, discuss policy effectiveness, or identify policies that underpin changes in the 
growth determinants we restrict our discussion to the growth effects of changes in the 
indicators representing the growth determinants. A discussion of what policies lead to these 
changes is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Section 2 presents stylized facts about growth and output volatility in the developing 
world. Section 3 presents the forecasting methodology and the data. Section 4 discusses the 
forecasts, the performance of the forecasting model, the growth effects of changes in growth 
determinants, and sensitivity tests. Section 5 offers caveats and concludes this paper. 
2. Stylized facts about growth and volatility in the developing world   
The average, annual per capita GDP growth rate for the world as a whole has been declining 
since the 1960s (Table 1B) reflecting to a large extent the declining GDP trend in the 
developed countries and their influence on the world.  
There are some notable differences across developing countries and regions. East Asia 
grew at the highest growth rate in the last four decades (column 2, Table 1A). With the 
exception of the 1970s, South Asia grew at the second highest growth rate in the developing 
world (Table 1B). Other developing regions, including Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Middle East and North Africa, have shown much less success in 
sustaining high growth rates. These three regions had their best growth rates in the 1960s and 
1970s, suffered a large decline in the 1980s, and except for Sub-Saharan Africa recovered 
somewhat in the 1990s.  
  There are some interesting differences across countries within regions and a number of 
success stories. In Africa, Botswana is the only country that grew at an average, yearly real 
per capita GDP growth rate above 1.5% for the past four decades (Table 1A). Uninterrupted 
civilian leadership, good macroeconomic and fiscal policies, progressive social policies as 
evidenced by the steep rise in secondary school enrollment (Figure 1), as well as a steady rise   5
in investment (Figure 1) resulted in an average annual per capita GDP growth rate of 6.3% in 
the past four decades. In the last decade there was a sharp drop in the output growth partly due 
to the impact of extremely high HIV/AIDS infection rate (highest in the world), but also due 
to leveling off in diamond mining production. The rest of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
grew in the sixties, but most of them slumped into low or negative growth rates in the 
seventies, eighties and the nineties due to a combination of poor policies, social conflict and 
negative external shocks. 
  In East Asia, there are more success stories driven by the booming economies of 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong (China), Taiwan (China) and Singapore. China 
leads the group of developing countries in the region whose per capita incomes grew on 
average above 3% per year over the past 4 decades. After a range of market-oriented reforms 
were implemented in the late 1970s, trade openness increased (Figure 2), growth accelerated 
and in the 1980s and 1990s public infrastructure and the economy grew at rates unseen 
anywhere else in the world (Figure 2, Table 1A).  
  In the Middle East and North Africa, two economies grew at rates above 3% per year 
over the past 40 years – Egypt and Tunisia. Egypt’s emphasis on education (Figure 3) and its 
“open” door policies, boosted by sizable increases in foreign direct investment, foreign 
assistance and workers’ remittances, launched the country on a path of high growth in the 
1970s. As the impact of these policies faded the government implemented structural and 
stabilization policies at the end of the 1980s (Figure 3) that led to sustained growth during 
much of the 1990s. Tunisia’s good growth record was a result of sound macroeconomic and 
public debt management policies, diversified economic base, gradual lessening of government 
control over economic affairs, steady pace of structural reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, good 
social policies and political stability.      6
  In South Asia, two economies grew at per capita growth rates above 3 percent in the 
last two decades – India and Sri Lanka. India benefited from its liberalization efforts, and in 
the 90s capitalized on its large number of well-educated people to become a leading exporter 
of services. However, its relatively low ratio of total secondary school enrollment (Figure 3) 
suggests that the potential gains from future investment in human capital in India could be 
sizable. Sri Lanka embarked on the path of market-oriented policies and export-oriented trade 
in the late seventies. Since then economic growth has been healthy due to good 
macroeconomic management, and steady progress in trade liberalization, privatization, and 
financial sector reforms. 
  In Latin America, 15 out of 17 countries on the continent experienced negative growth 
rates in the 1980s. Chile and Columbia were the exceptions. Chile benefited from initiating 
reforms earlier than other countries in the region, while Columbia had the best record of 
macroeconomic stability and external credit worthiness in the region. Most of the continental 
countries recovered in the 1990s as they conducted strong market-oriented reforms and 
accomplished economic and political stability.  
The Caribbean countries showed less uniform pattern of economic growth. The 
Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname had a similar experience 
to the continental countries – a sharp drop in economic activity in the 1980s and a recovery in 
the 1990s. The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize and the small island countries followed a 
decreasing growth pattern over the past 40 or 30 years. Political instability and economic mis-
management doomed Haiti to three decades of negative per capita growth. Jamaica failed to 
sustain the increase in growth in the 1980s due to crime, frequent banking crises, and rising 
debt burden. 
  The developed countries experienced the least output volatility, followed by the 
countries in South Asia (Table 2B). In both regions output volatility has been declining since   7
the 1970s – the decade of oil shocks. Although at larger levels of volatility than developed 
and South Asian countries, a similar declining trend characterizes Africa and the Middle East 
(Table 2A). After declining over the 1970s and the 1980s, volatility in East Asia increased 
and surpassed the levels observed in the 1960s. However, while in the 1960s China generated 
most of the volatility in the region, in the 1990s the responsible parties were the other 
economies in the region. In Latin America and the Caribbean volatility increased in the poor 
decade of the 1980s and declined in the decade of recovery (the 1990s). These patterns are 
similar across countries in the region (Table 2B).  
3. Methodology 
Our model of choice is the cross-country growth framework which follows the vast empirical 
literature spawned by the neoclassical growth model. According to the neoclassical model
2 
income converges to its steady state as follows: 
) ( *
.
y y y − − = λ ,            ( 1 )  
where  y is real per capita income, y*  is the steady state per capita income, and 
) )( 1 ( δ α λ + + − = g n  is a function of the following exogenous parameters – the capital share 
α, the rate of population growth n, the rate of growth in technology g, and the rate of capital 
depreciation δ. Equation (1), which holds for any type of production function, is derived by 
taking the first order Taylor expansion of the right-hand side of the capital accumulation 
equation around the steady state and the production function y=f(k), where k is capital K per 
efficiency unit of labor AL (k=K/AL). 
                                                 
2 Solow (1956) introduced its most basic version, in which the saving rate is exogenous. This assumption can be 
relaxed if we add explicit household behavior as in an overlapping generations model a la Paul Samuelson and 
Peter Diamond or in a Ramsey type model with a single, infinitely lived representative consumer. Although the 
two models can differ substantially, the two approaches yield similar results to the Solow model. In particular, in 
both models the economy reaches a steady state with a constant saving rate and this steady state has the same 
characteristics as the steady states in the Solow model. Therefore, for the purpose of studying economic growth, 
the household behavior is not essential.   8
Despite its shortcomings
3 and empirical inadequacies,
4 the neoclassical model is 
useful for explaining cross country variations in economic growth. The model fits the 
evidence that a country’s initial level of per capita income is not correlated with its 
subsequent growth rate, i.e. poor countries do not tend to grow fast relative to developed 
countries. The model does not predict convergence to the same steady state, but predicts that 
different countries reach different steady-state levels determined by different growth 
determinants and external factors, and countries have different rates of growth, depending on 
each country’s initial deviation from its own steady state (Figure 4). 
In the last couple of decades, the availability of international data made it possible to 
conduct cross-country empirical research on economic growth (Barro 1991, 1999; King and 
Levine 1993; Loayza et al. 2005). The typical empirical cross-country regressions follow 
directly from Solow’s equation (1). They have on their left-hand side each country’s average 
growth rate over a long period, while on the right-hand side is a set of variables expected to 
determine the growth rate: 
*
.
. . y y y λ λ + − =         ( 2 )    
The growth rate is diminishing in the initial level of per capita output y given y* and rising in 
the steady state level of per capita output y* for given y (Figure 4). 
The growth equation (2) can also be written in log form as: 
                                                 
3 The model does not explain the existence of growth without assuming exogenous advances in technology and 
that different countries use the same production function at a given point in time. Neither of these shortcomings 
is serious. It is obvious that income per capita grows as knowledge expands. Endogenous growth models address 
the first shortcoming explicitly. The basic endogenous growth model (the AK model) can be viewed as a limiting 
case of the neoclassical growth model in which the steady state is independent of saving. While endogenous 
growth models help explain the existence of worldwide technological progress and offer a more realistic 
explanation of the process of innovation, there have been few attempts to evaluate these models empirically and 
use them to explain international differences in growth rates. The second shortcoming is also not serious since 
one can consider different countries to be at different points along the same production possibilities frontier.  
4 The neoclassical model predicts the rate of convergence, income and rate of return differentials observed in the 
world only for large values of the capital share. Possible explanations for a large capital share (e.g. two-thirds) 
include externalities to capital and redefinition of capital income to include not only return to physical capital, 
but also human capital.   9
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where X is the set of variables determining steady state growth y*, ε is the error term, and 
subscripts  i and t refer to country and time period, respectively. The set of steady state 
determinants in X typically includes indexes or proxies that represent outcomes of effective 
structural policies and institutions, stabilization policies, and external conditions. These 
include indexes reflecting the state of education, financial markets, trade, public sector and 
governance, macroeconomic conditions, and external factors.  
Education has both a direct and indirect positive effect on growth. The direct effect 
counteracts the diminishing returns on other factors of production and affects long-run growth 
positively (Lucas, 1988). The indirect effect stems from the fact that human capital is a 
complement to physical capital, sets the pace for technological innovations, and facilitates 
technological absorptions (Borensztein et al., 1998; Olofsdotter, 1998). 
Well functioning markets also promote growth. Developed financial markets promote 
growth since they facilitate risk diversification, investment and saving, and reduce the 
incidence of inefficient investment. Openness to trade promotes long-run growth since it leads 
to increased specialization thereby boosting productivity, expands potential markets allowing 
local firms to take advantage of economies of scale; facilitates diffusion of technological 
innovations and base-case managerial practices; and lessens anticompetitive practices and 
rent-seeking.  
The actions of the government affect growth in a number of ways. Inefficient 
government policies including high taxes, ineffective public programs and large bureaucracy 
can distort markets, and interfere negatively in the economy by assuming roles most suited for 
the private sector. Governments’ failure to invest in public infrastructure affects negatively 
long run growth as it lowers productivity and deters investment. Governance encompasses 
several aspects of institutional quality including respect for civil and political rights,   10
bureaucratic efficiency, enforcement of contractual agreements, and the prevalence of law and 
order (Mauro 1995; Knack and Keefer 1995; Barro, 1996; Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton, 1999). Recent empirical research supports the importance of institutional quality 
(Easterly and Levine 2003; IMF, World Economic Outlook 2003). 
Macroeconomic stability is important for growth. By reducing uncertainty, a stable 
macroeconomic environment encourages firms to invest, and allows agents to concentrate on 
productive activities rather than on managing risk. Macroeconomic conditions are represented 
in cross-country regression models by including indexes measuring price stability, output 
volatility, real exchange rate overvaluation, the risk of a balance of payment crisis, and 
systemic banking crises.
5  
Finally, external conditions influence the domestic economy. Terms of trade shocks 
capture changes in the international demand for countries’ exports and the cost of production 
and consumption inputs. Period-specific changes affecting countries globally summarize 
prevalent global conditions at a given period of time and reflect worldwide recessions and 
booms, changes in the allocation and cost of international capital flows, and technological 
innovations. 
We chose the empirical cross-country growth framework from a vast range of 
forecasting tools.
6 Our choice was motivated by the following reasons. While for some 
developed countries extrapolations of historical data using log-linear trends can produce 
surprisingly accurate predictions of current GDP levels (Fatás 2000),
7 Kraay and 
Monokroussos (1999) find that it is difficult to choose the “best” model for forecasting real 
                                                 
5 Systemic banking crisis can result from overly contractionary monetary policies and overly expansionary fiscal 
policies. They may also be a product of an inadequate regulatory framework for financial transactions, which 
leads to over-lending and unsustainable consumption booms. 
6 We do so despite the belief that empirical growth regressions have been misused through flexible specifications 
that can lead to any desired result.  
7 For instance, a linear trend model estimated using data from 1880 to 1929 can help predict the GDP level in the 
U.S. in 2000 with a forecast error of less than 5% (Jones, 1995).   11
per capita GDP for a particular country or group of countries. Their comparison of the 
univariate time series model for real per capita GDP and a cross-country growth regression 
model for a sample of developed and developing countries reveals that neither one clearly 
dominates as a forecasting tool. 
The time series techniques of separating the business cycle from the long-run trend
8 
will not allow us to decompose the growth effects of various growth determinants precluding 
scenario analysis or exercises aimed at assessing for instance the impact of a terms-of-trade 
shock on growth. Moreover, lack of sufficiently long time series for the transition and newly 
formed countries precludes the use of this technique for many developing economies.  
The IMF production function methodology, which represents the middle ground 
between a full-scale structural model to determine potential output, and the mechanistic time 
series models, allows for an explicit growth accounting in terms of the capital, labor and total 
factor productivity contributions (De Masi 1997), but it too is not appropriate for forecasting 
developing countries’ growth. The data requirements are significant and some variables such 
as capital stock are difficult to measure and update. Since total factor productivity is not 
directly observable, estimating its trend poses many of the same challenges and uncertainties 
as estimating potential output. The existence of large informal labor markets in developing 
countries implies that the potential input of labor cannot be determined by the behavior of 
unemployment relative to its natural rate.  
For transition economies, the short period of time which has elapsed since the 
transition process began, combined with the lack of reliable data prior to the beginning of the 
transition process, preclude using the IMF’s standard production function approach, the de-
                                                 
8 Examples of such techniques are the segmented-trend approach, the Hodrich Prescott filter, the Baxter-King 
filter among others. Barrell and Sefton (1995) review the methods for estimating potential output.   12
trending techniques to estimate potential output growth, or vector autoregressions.
9 The IMF 
has chosen to construct long term growth scenarios for the transition countries based on the 
long term growth experiences in other parts of the world.
10 A major shortcoming of this 
approach is the need to estimate the rate of total factor productivity growth, which typically 
varies substantially over time and across countries.
11  
Although we could choose from the myriad of cross-country growth regression models 
in the literature, we adopted the growth framework and forecasting methodology in Loayza et 
al. (2005). The main reason for our choice is the fact that we had access to their panel dataset. 
It meant that we could avoid the cost of building a large panel data. Another reason is the fact 
that Loayza et al. (2005) employed state-of-the-art panel estimation techniques. Their 
published forecasts for 20 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean for the period 2001-
2010 are already widely used in the World Bank’s economic and sector work.
12 Loayza et al. 
(2005) obtain these forecasts by estimating a cross-country growth regression model based on 
a panel dataset that included 78 countries from various regions in the world (Table 1)
13 
spanning the period 1961-99 and then forecasting real per capita GDP growth by generating 
simple univariate forecasting models for the growth determinants in the model.  
Loayza et al. (2005) depart from the standard practice and emphasize the importance 
of differentiating between trend output growth and cyclical output movements (Figure 4). The 
cyclical output movements are bound to be important in their panel dataset representing 
                                                 
9 Kraay and Monokroussos (1999) suggest that vector autoregressions in a small set of key macroeconomic 
variables, estimated country by country, may be a way to improve over the forecast performance of both 
univariate time series and cross-country growth regression models. The advantage of this approach over the 
univariate time series models is that it draws on a larger information set. Another advantage is that it relaxes the 
restrictive assumption of cross-country regression models that the parameters of the model are equal across 
countries. 
10 See IMF (1996), Chapter 5. 
11 The IMF uses an endogenous growth model to assess the rate of technical change (De Masi 1997). 
12 See, for instance, El Salvador’s Country Economic Memorandum 2003. 
13 Table 1 displays the developing countries in the panel data. The developed countries in the panel, not shown in 
Table 1, are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.   13
relatively short time periods of 5-year averages. In order to account for the cyclical reversion 
to the trend, they include in the standard growth model (3) the output gap at the start of the 
period:  
it i t it
T
s it s it s it
s it it X y y y
s
y y
ε η μ λ β α + + + + − + =
−
− − −
− ' ) ln (ln ln
ln ln
,     (4) 
where s=5 and 
T
s it s it y y − − −ln ln  is the output gap. They also add a time specific effect t μ , and 
a country-specific effect i η . Controlling for the initial output gap allows them to improve the 
regression fit and avoid overestimating the speed of transitional convergence. The output gap 
in the regression is given by the difference between (the log of) potential (trend) and actual 
GDP per capita around the start of the period. The trend output is obtained using the Baxter-
King filter for each country in the sample (Baxter and King, 1999).  
The inclusion of the initial output gap in the growth regression model is contentious 
because with the steady state shifting over time there is no stable long-run trend that can be 
identified using the filter. We therefore forecast real per capita GDP growth using a pure cross 
section version of the regression model (4). The model includes all variables representing 
convergence factors and structural policies mentioned earlier, and only one variable in the 
category of stabilization policy (inflation). These are the most pertinent to growth over a long 
time span and the most commonly found in the empirical growth literature. 
In this paper we use Loayza et al.’s panel data and panel estimates to forecast real per 
capita GDP growth for the set of all developing countries for the period 2005-14. We do so 
without having to forecast each of the steady state growth determinants in X.
14 Only for the 
set of 35 developing countries in Loayza et al.’s panel data (the panel contains 55 developing 
and 23 developed economies), we quantify the growth effects of individual growth 
                                                 
14 We can do this because the growth model is estimated using averages of the underlying growth determinants 
in the five year prior to the last year of the current period. Kraay and Monokroussos (1999) use this approach   14
determinants in X by forecasting their future values using univariate forecasting models and 
assuming that they evolve following past trends. For the 20 countries in Latin America and 
Caribbean we cite results from Loayza et al. (2005). Next we discuss the panel data, the 
estimation methodology, and the forecasting models.    
3.1 Data 
Loayza et al. (2005) estimate cross-country regression (4) using cross-country, time-series 
panel data, spanning the period 1961-99. The following variables are part of their panel.  
Growth per capita (dlny) is the log difference of real GDP per capita, represented in 
1995 PPP-adjusted US dollars and constructed using Summers and Heston (1991) and World 
Bank (2002). For the calculation of a period’s growth rate, the base corresponds to the final 
year of the previous period. Initial per capita GDP (lny) is the initial value of the ratio of total 
GDP to total population
15 and is computed using data in Summers and Heston (1991) and the 
World Bank (2002). Initial output gap (lny-lny
T) is the difference between the log of actual 
per capita GDP and the log of potential (trend) per capita GDP at the start of the period. The 
trend per capita GDP is identified using the Baxter-King filter.  
The regression includes the following steady state growth determinants in X’ (equation 
4): education, financial depth, trade openness, government burden, public infrastructure, and 
governance.  
Education is measured as the ratio of total secondary enrollment to the population of 
the age group that officially corresponds to that level of education. This “flow” variable – 
used as proxy for human capital in Barro (1991), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and 
Easterly (2001) – captures more closely current education policies and human capital 
investment than “stock” measures related with the educational attainment of the adult 
                                                 
15 GDP is in 1985 PPP-adjusted US$.   15
population or life expectancy. The World Bank (2002) is the source for the data on total 
secondary school enrollment and population of the age group corresponding officially to that 
level of education.  
Financial depth is computed as the ratio to GDP of the stock of claims on the private 
sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2000). This measure of financial depth is significantly correlated with other proxies 
such as the traditional measure of financial depth (M2/GDP). Indicators of other aspects of 
financial markets, such as the size and activity of the stock markets, can also be used as 
proxies for financial depth. However, data availability and the fact that incentives to perform 
efficiently are clearer and stronger for private agents make this measure the preferred proxy 
for the size and activity of financial markets in recent empirical studies (Levine, Loayza and 
Beck, 2000). 
Trade openness is the residual of a regression of the log of the trade (exports and 
imports) to GDP ratio on the logs of area and population, and dummies for oil exporting and 
landlocked countries. The variables in the regression are constructed from data in the World 
Bank (2002). This structure-adjusted trade openness measure ensures that one would not be 
attributing to trade policy outcomes resulting from structural country characteristics.
16  
Government burden is measured with the ratio of government consumption to GDP 
(World Bank, 2002). The rationale for this choice is that current government consumption is 
devoted mainly to covering the bureaucracy’s wage bill. One might argue that not all of 
government consumption is wasteful as expenditures on health, education and law and order 
promote growth. Loayza et al., however, did not adjust for these growth promoting 
                                                 
16 For instance, landlocked countries may trade less than other countries as they face high transport costs. For oil 
exporters, large trade volumes may co-exist with high import tariffs.    16
expenditures because they could not find consistent data on these expenditures for a large 
sample of countries in their panel.
17  
Public infrastructure is measured with the number of telephone mainlines per capita in 
a country (Canning, 1998). Alternative proxies of public infrastructure are energy generation 
capacity and transport facilities. Loayza et al. (2005) found these to be highly correlated with 
each other and concluded that results would be quantitatively similar for any of them.   
Governance is measured with the first principal components of four indicators from 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): prevalence of law and order, quality of 
bureaucracy, absence of corruption, and accountability of public officials. All of them enter 
with approximately identical weights in their first principal component. There are other 
measures of governance but these are typically highly correlated with each other. Loayza et 
al. determined that the correlation coefficients between the ICRG index used in their study 
and the Gastil’s index of civil liberties and the Business Environment Risk Intelligence index 
were 0.79 and 0.85, respectively. 
The set of long-run growth determinants X’ includes the following stabilization 
indicators: inflation, cyclical volatility, real exchange rate overvaluation, and the number of 
years in which a country underwent a systemic banking crisis. Inflation – an indicator of 
macroeconomic stability in many cross-country growth studies
18 – is measured by the 
consumer price index (World Bank 2002). The inflation rate is positively correlated with 
other indicators such as fiscal balance (0.24) and black market premiums (0.26) (Loayza et al. 
2005). Cyclical volatility, which reflects the lack of output stability, is computed as the 
standard deviation of the output gap for the period. Real exchange rate overvaluation – a 
measure for external imbalances and the risk of balance-of-payments crises – is given by the 
                                                 
17 Loayza et al. note that the presence of initial GDP per capita and the governance indicator in regression model 
(4) help to control for the fact that not all government consumption can be regarded as an obstacle to growth. 
18 See Fischer (1993), Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997), Barro (2001), Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2001).    17
real effective exchange rate, adjusted so that the average for 1976-85 equals Dollar’s (1992) 
index of overvaluation
19 (Source: Easterly 2001). The number of years in which a country 
underwent a systemic banking crisis as a fraction of the number of years in the corresponding 
period is computed based on data from Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1998).  
The terms of trade shock in the matrix of growth determinants X’ in model (4) is 
computed as the log difference of the terms of trade (Source: World Bank 2002). The period-
specific shifts μ in model (4) are time dummy variables.  
3.2 The forecasting model   
The forecasting model used in this study is derived by differencing model (4): 
s
y y
G G y y
s
y y s it it
it s it s it it
it s it −
+ −
+ −
+ − + − =
− ln ln
) ( ˆ ) ln (ln ˆ ln ln ' φ α , (5) 
where s=10 since we work with 10 year periods, matrix G contains the initial output gap, 
matrix X, and the time specific shift; and   ) , ' , ( μ λ β φ = .
20 In general, the forecasting model 
(5) can be used to forecasts growth for any number of periods of length s, where s could be 
any positive integer number. However, using this model to produce growth forecasts for the 
next 1 to 3 years is not recommended since many of the factors affecting the short term 
outlook are not included in the model.  
Coefficients ( φ α ˆ   , ˆ ) were estimated by Loayza et al. (2005) using the GMM systems 
estimator on a 5-year average panel dataset
21 (see last column, Appendix Table 1 and the 
fourth column, Appendix Table 2). The GMM systems estimator, developed by Arellano and 
                                                 
19 The Dollar’s index of overvaluation gives an idea to what extent the real exchange rate is distorted away from 
its free-trade level by the trade regime. 
20 As a result of the differencing the country specific term is eliminated from forecasting model (5). 
21 The 5-year panel dataset contains 78 countries – fifty five of them developing – and for each of them, a 
minimum of 3 and a maximum of 8 non-overlapping 5-year observations (the sample is unbalanced). A 
minimum of 3 observations per country is required to implement the instrumental –variable methodology for the 
GMM estimators. The total number of observations equals 350.   18
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997), combines in a system regression model (4) in 
differences and levels. The regression in differences requires differencing model (4) and using 
instruments to deal with the likely endogeneity of the independent variables, and the fact that 
in the differenced model the error term is correlated with one of the explanatory variables – 
the lagged dependent variable. The instruments consist of previous observations of the 
explanatory and lagged-dependent variables. The GMM estimator assumes that the error term 
in model (4) is not serially correlated and the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. 
The instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the corresponding 
variables. These are appropriate instruments assuming there is no correlation between the 
differences of the independent variables in model (4) and the country specific effect. This 
GMM estimator is consistent and efficient.
22 
To test the robustness of the estimates Loayza et al. (2005) estimate model (4) using 
various other estimation techniques. They use the ‘pooled’ OLS estimator, the ‘within’ OLS 
estimator, and the GMM levels estimator for the dynamic model of 5-year and 10-year panel 
datasets
23 (Appendix Table 1), and the OLS estimator for the pure-cross section model
24 
(Appendix Table 2). Each of these alternative techniques has its shortcomings. The ‘pooled’ 
OLS estimator ignores the presence of country-specific effects and treats all variables as 
exogenous, while the ‘within’ OLS estimator ignores the joint endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables. The GMM levels estimator uses instruments to control for joint endogeneity but 
ignores country specific effects. 
                                                 
22 The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged values of the dependent variables are 
valid instruments in the regression. Loayza et al. conducted a Sargent test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the 
estimation process, and tested the null hypothesis for serial correlation of the error term in model (4). The Sargan 
and serial correlation tests could not reject the null hypothesis of correct specification of the main model. 
23 The sample based on 10-year averages consists of an unbalanced panel of 65 countries and 175 observations. 
24 The sample based on 30-year averages consists of one observation for 70 countries. A country is excluded 
from the pure cross section sample if there is no complete information for at least 30 years during the period 
1966-99.   19
  All estimated coefficients, except governance, are robust to changes in the estimation 
method (Appendix Table 1). The statistical significance and estimated size of most 
coefficients are similar across methods. The coefficient on governance changes its sign, but it 
is not statistically significant. Governance is not statistically significant despite the fact that 
the governance index has the second largest positive correlation with the growth rate of GDP 
per capita. This result is robust to changes in the governance index – for instance replacing it 
with its components, which include indicators on bureaucratic efficiency, corruption, law and 
order, and accountability or with Gastil’s index on civil rights. The result is similar to that of 
Dollar and Kraay (2003), and contrasts that in Easterly and Levine (2002).   
   The signs of the estimated coefficients are robust to changes in the time horizon (30-
year averages vs. 5-year averages, see Appendix Table 2).
25 However, there are differences in 
the size and significance of some coefficients. Financial depth and trade openness are not 
statistically significant in the case of pure cross-section OLS. A possible explanation for the 
lack of significance is the omission of banking crisis and terms of trade shocks, which control 
for some negative aspects of financial depth (credit booms) and trade openness (external 
vulnerability).  
Given these differences and the fact that we would like to forecast real per capita GDP 
using a pure cross-section regression, which resembles most closely the models in the 
empirical literature and excludes the initial output gap from the set of independent variables, 
we produce growth forecasts using the pure-cross section version of growth forecasting model 
(5). In this case, matrix G does not include the initial output gap and stabilization policies 
other than inflation. Coefficients ( φ α ˆ   , ˆ ) were estimated by Loayza et al. (2005) using the OLS 
estimator (see second column, Appendix Table 2). We compare the forecasts from the pure 
                                                 
25 As mentioned earlier, the pure cross-country regression includes trend growth and all variables depicting 
structural policies and institutions, and one variable in the category of stabilization (inflation).   20
cross-section model estimated with the OLS estimator with those from the dynamic panel 
estimated with the GMM estimator below (see Table 5). 
4. Growth forecasts 
We forecast real per capita GDP growth rates for all developing countries for the period 2005-
14 assuming no changes in any of the explanatory variables in matrix G of forecasting model 
(5). Under this assumption transitional convergence is the only factor determining the change 
in real per capita growth from one period to the next (α=-0.0176). Table 3 displays the 
country forecasts, which are point estimates representing the most likely growth outcomes, 
jointly with their 60% confidence bands.
26 From a policy perspective these confidence 
intervals are more useful than the 90% confidence bands reported in Table 5 since the later 
are large as is the case for other forecasting models, and most policy analysts are not 
interested in low probability outcomes.  
The confidence intervals are computed by rewriting equation (4) as shown below:  
  s it s it it
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and assuming that matrix Z, which incorporates all right-hand side variables other than initial 
income, is a function of non-random variables, and ϕ, which includes the respective 
coefficients, is also non-random.  
From equation (5) it follows that the variance of the forecast for the next period is: 
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26 In the case of the 60% confidence bands, we can infer that growth rates higher (lower) than the upper (lower) 
end of the confidence interval occur with 20% probability.   21
Using actual and predicted values for growth, we compute the residuals  it ε ˆ  and its variance 
2 ˆ ) ˆ ( i it V σ ε = .
27 The 60% confidence interval around the forecasted growth rate is then given 
by
2 ˆ 84 . 0 i σ ± , while the formula for the 90% confidence interval is 
2 ˆ 64 . 1 i σ ± .
28 
We compute two types of regional averages. The first one reflects weights which 
represent the share of per capita income in the simple average, regional per capita income.  
The second one uses weights which reflect economic size and are computed as the share of 
income in the average regional income. The two measures may differ substantially if the 
region is dominated by a large country such as China in the case of East Asia and Pacific 
(Table 3A and Table 4). 
For the developing world as a whole we forecast average, annual real per capita 
growth of 2.2%. We arrive at this growth rate if we use weights which represent the share of 
per capita income in the simple average, regional per capita income. If we use weights which 
reflect the size of the economies and are computed as the share of income in the average 
regional income, the growth rate for the developing world as a whole is 3.5%. This forecast is 
almost identical to the one published in Global Economic Prospects (2004)
29 and shown in 
Table 4. Even though in two instances (Europe and Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Table 4) the GEP’s regional forecasts are close to ours, in all the other cases they are higher 
than our estimates implying a growth forecast for the developing world higher than 3.4%.  
  The forecasts, obtained using the pure cross section version of the forecasting model, 
are displayed in Table 5. The model excludes the initial output gap and all stabilization policy 
variables except inflation. Again, we assume that transitional convergence is the only factor 
                                                 
27 For countries having information on actual and predicted values for growth for no more than one period, 
2 ˆi σ  is 
estimated using the variance of  it ε ˆ  for all countries. 
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29 See Table 1.5, pp.43 in Global Economic Prospects 2004.   22
determining the change in real per capita growth (α=-0.024). The forecasts obtained with the 
pure cross section model are close to those obtained with the dynamic panel model. On 
average the forecasts differ by 0.12 percentage points, and in only 4 cases they differ by more 
than 0.5 percentage points. A comparison of the confidence intervals suggests that the 
dynamic panel model estimated with the GMM estimator provides a better regression fit than 
the pure cross section model estimated with the OLS estimator.  
4.1 Evaluation of the forecasting model 
Next we undertake a formal and systematic evaluation of the ex-post performance of 
forecasting model (5). For this purpose we conduct an out-of-sample and with-in sample 
forecasting exercises.  
4.1.1 Out-of-sample forecasting 
The dynamic panel dataset used in the estimation of forecasting model (5) includes data up to 
2000, and we use the model to obtain forecasts for 2004. We then compare these forecasts 
with actual data. We do so using two simple statistics that capture respectively the bias and 
mean squared error of the forecasts – the cumulative forecast error statistic (CFE) and the 
Theil-U statistic (TU). Since in this case there is only one period the CFE statistic is given by 
the following expression: 
5









where  5 ˆ + it y  is the forecast and  5 + it y  is the actual outcome. The statistic is scaled by the actual 
outcomes in order to make it comparable across countries. Similarly, the Theil-U statistic, 
which measures the variability or precision of the forecasts, is defined as follows:
 30 
                                                 













All other things equal, one would prefer forecasting methods with CFE and TU statistics near 
zero.  
  For each country, we calculate the CFE and TU statistics and present the results in 
Table 6. Due to missing data on per capita GDP for the period 2000-2004 for 25 countries the 
table reports statistics for only 127 developing countries. The countries marked with asterisks 
belong to the panel used to estimate forecasting model (5). Table 6C shows also the median 
and the average of the CFE and TU statistics. We compare the medians of the CFE and TU 
statistics to those computed by Kraay and Monokrousos (1999).
31 They compute CFE and TU 
statistic for 73 countries and for two types of forecasting models – a univariate time-series 
model of real per capita GDP and a cross-country growth regression model. The median of 
the CFE for the growth forecasting model in their forecasting exercise is 0.006 after the first 5 
years. This value is very close in absolute terms to the median CFE with forecasting model (5) 
(-0.007), after the first 5 years. Their median value of the TU statistic for the growth 
forecasting model is slightly under 0.0002 after the initial 5 years. With forecasting model (5) 
the median CFE is 0.0001. The average value of the CFE (-0.0084) is slightly larger than the 
median in absolute value (-0.0070). The average TU statistic is also higher than the median 
(0.0004) but still relatively small.  
  The statistics suggest that in the first five years the growth forecasting model performs 
on average no worse than the growth forecasting model in Kraay and Monokroussos (1999). 
However, while their growth model tends to overestimate the actual growth rate, the growth 
forecasting model (5) tends to underestimate the growth rate. Since the cumulative median 
bias in the level of forecasted real per capita GDP after 5 years is 7% of per capita GDP, the 
                                                 
31 They report the medians and not the averages since for some countries one model or the other delivered 
“crazy” forecasts resulting in very large TU or CFE statistics (in absolute value).   24
downward bias in average annual growth forecasts over this period is around 1.4% per year. 
The upward bias in Kraay and Monokroussos estimates is of similar order of magnitude.  
The statistics for individual countries reveal for which countries the forecasting model 
performs better or worse than the absolute value of the average cumulative forecast error 
(0.0084), and the types of the bias. For half of the countries in Table 6 the bias is larger than 
the average in absolute value. However, half of the countries for which the bias is larger than 
the average are not part of the panel dataset used to estimate the growth forecasting model (5). 
The bias is positive in only 38 of the 127 cases. For only 13 of these 38 countries the positive 
bias is larger than the absolute value of the average (0.0084). The country cases for which 
forecasting model (5) performs no worse than the average are marked in grey. These are 
countries for which the absolute value of the CFE is smaller or approximately equal to the 
absolute value of the average CFE in Table 6.  
4.1.2 With-in sample forecasting 
One question of interest is whether the model forecasts well changes in growth between 
decades. In order to answer this question we have compared actual and forecasted changes in 
growth rates between the 1980s and the 1990s for the 55 developing countries that are part of 
the panel data used in the estimation of the forecasting model. In 76 percent of the cases the 
model projects an increase (decrease) when growth accelerated (decelerated) (Table 7). In 44 
percent of the cases (marked in grey), the model’s forecasted changes in growth are relatively 
close to the actual changes (less than a percentage point away from the actual change). In 
nearly half of these cases (marked with asterisks in Table 7), the model performs well both 
within and out-of sample.  
The reasons why in some cases the forecasted changes are very different from the 
actual ones can be traced to developments not captured in the model. Falling into civil war   25
and natural disasters impair a country’s growth performance in ways that are not captured by 
the determinants in the model. Conversely, recovering from civil conflict or a natural disaster 
is bound to have a beneficial impact on growth. For example, Zaire (DRC), Republic of 
Congo, and Sierra Leone were torn by civil conflicts in the 90s. This effect – not captured in 
the model – explains why the forecasted growth changes between the two decades in these 
three countries are positive, while the actual changes are negative. The impact of financial 
crisis in a country has an effect that spreads to economies in the region and beyond. This 
effect, also not captured by the model, is a reason why the forecasts for China, Indonesia, and 
Thailand overestimate the growth change for these countries between the 90s and the 80s. 
Another reason for the discrepancy between the forecasted and actual changes in the growth 
rates is that some countries may not be close to the “average” country in the sample. 
4.2 Growth effects of public policies 
For 55 of the countries in the panel used to estimate model (5), we present a set of real per 
capita GDP growth forecasts that reflect the growth effects of various factors underpinning 
long term growth assuming that these growth determinants evolve following past trends.
32 We 
forecasted the growth determinants in matrix Z of forecasting model (6) by building 280 
univariate forecasting models – one model for each of the variables in matrix Z and each of 
the 35 countries.
33  
We use univariate stochastic trend models with ARMA terms in the case of a unit root 
(I(1) or I(2)) and deterministic linear trend models with ARMA terms in the case of a 
stationary variable (I(0)) to forecast the growth determinants.
34 The forecasts of the 
                                                 
32 Although the panel estimation procedures employed take into account the endogeneity of the various growth 
determinants (right-hand-side variables), this endogeneity is ignored in this forecasting exercise where the 
growth determinants are described using simple univariate models.  
33 We forecast only 8 of the 11 variables in matrix Z. For reasons discussed in this section of the paper we leave 
the other 3 variables unchanged.  
34 The forecasting models are available upon request.    26
underlying growth determinants for the 20 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
come from Loayza et al. (2005).  
We test each growth determinant for a unit root, I(1). The unit root tests include a 
trend implying that the test has unit root as the null hypothesis. This is consistent with the 
presumption that we ‘accept’ the null hypothesis of a unit root unless confronted with strong 
evidence to the contrary. To account for possible heteroskedasticity we compute White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. In most cases the changes to the standard errors 
were insignificant. 
Instead of considering that a variable has a quadratic trend or a unit root plus trend, we 
consider the more plausible specification that the variable is I(2). It is possible to test whether 
there is a significant trend in the presence of a unit root. However, such a model is rarely used 
since it is difficult to justify that the growth rate shrinks or grows in a linear fashion. Often, a 
naïve curve fitting exercise (ignoring unit roots) will find a quadratic trend term that is 
significant (and perhaps higher order terms). Although the higher-order trend terms allow you 
to fit the data better ex post, the model will often perform poorly in out of sample forecasting 
(Sims, 1999). 
  A few growth determinants were treated in a different way. We assume that the 
number of years in which a country underwent a systemic banking crisis remains the same 
over the next decade. We believe that this is the best we could do given that the occurrence of 
a banking crisis is difficult to predict even with sophisticated models. Loayza et al. (2005) use 
a more sophisticated technique to forecast this variable,
35 but their technique tends to result in 
a similar outcome as ours. They estimate low probabilities of new banking crises in countries 
                                                 
35 They use a panel data model to estimate the probability of crisis based on an index of real exchange rate 
overvaluation and the previous occurrence of crisis.   27
that did not have one in the 90s and the early 2000s, and for those that had crises they 
estimate a gradually decreasing probability of reoccurrence.  
We assume that cyclical volatility in the next decade is the same as in the 90s. While 
we saw that in many countries cyclical volatility declined over the past 4 decades, this trend 
was not universal and in many countries cyclical volatility increased. Given the difficulties 
involved in predicting accurately changes in output volatility, we believe that it is best if we 
leave the cyclical volatility unchanged.   
In the case of China, the assumption of continuous trend growth in public investment 
led to an explosive trajectory – an unlikely trend given historical evidence from other 
countries. This evidence suggests that the high growth rate of public investment at the initial 
stages of development eventually slows down and public investment keeps on growing at a 
declining rate. Public investment in both Korea and Japan exhibited this type of growth 
patterns. For this reasons we adopted Korea as a benchmark and limited the average growth 
rate in public investment in China in the period 2005-2014 to the average growth rate in 
Korea in the period 1982-1992. 
Finally, as in Loayza et al. (2005) we assume that world growth conditions that 
determine the period shift will remain approximately the same in the next decade as in the 
90s. While this is likely to be untrue, given that world growth conditions have differed 
notably between decades in the past, it allows us to focus on the contribution of structural and 
stabilization policies rather than on external conditions that are very difficult to forecast.  
Once we obtain the univariate forecast of a growth determinant, we compute the rate 
of change in the growth determinant’s average for the period and multiply it with the 
corresponding coefficient’s estimate in model (5) (displayed in the forth column of Appendix 
Table 2). This way we arrive at the contribution of the growth determinant to the change in 
average per capita GDP growth between two consecutive periods 2005-14 and 1995-2004.    28
Table 8 presents the contribution to growth of all growth determinants in forecasting 
model (5), and the forecasted per capita growth rates for the 55 countries. The results suggest 
that for the average developing country the largest growth dividend comes from continued 
improvements in public infrastructure, followed by the growth contributions of rising 
secondary school enrollment, trade openness, and financial deepening. The joint contribution 
of these four growth determinants to average, annual per capita GDP growth in the next 
decade is estimated to be 1 percentage point (Table 8B). Failure to keep on improving public 
infrastructure alone could reduce this growth dividend by 50%.  
The large estimated contributions of public investment to the forecasted growth 
changes are due to the large forecasted changes in this growth determinant, not to the size of 
the estimated coefficient on this variable. The estimated coefficient on public investment is 60 
percent smaller than the coefficient on secondary education, 30 percent smaller than the 
coefficient on trade openness and approximately equal to the coefficient on financial depth 
(Appendix Table 1).  
A comparison of the implied growth rates of the growth determinants also suggests 
that the results are driven by the projected increases in the respective growth determinants. 
For instance, the estimated contribution of infrastructure investment to per capita GDP growth 
of the average country in South Asia is close to 1 percentage point (Table 8B). Such an 
increase implies an annual, average growth in the investment measure - the number of main 
telephone lines per capita, of around 27 percent. This growth rate is 10 times the growth rate 
of secondary school enrollment in the region. The implied yearly growth rates of the 
investment indicator for the average country in the other regions in Table 8 are between 4 and 
5 times the annual growth rates in secondary school enrollment in these regions.    29
The forecasted growth contributions differ by region and country. For the average 
developing country in East Asia and Latin America the growth effects of improving trade 
openness will be larger than those of financial sector deepening. The reverse is the case in 
South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa. In these three regions 
efforts to reduce the government burden will be beneficial to growth. For example, preventing 
further increases in government consumption could add 0.2 percentage points per year to 
average real per capita GDP growth in South Asia and Latin America in the next decade.  
At the country level, the results in Table 8 allow us to make a number of interesting 
observations. In China, continued government efforts to improve infrastructure, education, 
and access to credit and open markets could add up to 2 percentage points to per capita 
average real GDP growth in the period 2005-2014. Failure to improve public infrastructure 
alone could lead to a drop in the average per capita real GDP growth rate of a little less than a 
percentage point.
36   
In India, failure to invest in infrastructure could cost real per capita growth 1.32 
percentage points. This will bring down the average, annual real per capita GDP growth rate 
from 4.90 percent to 3.58 percent over the next decade - a growth rate that is unlikely to lead 
to a significant drop in the country’s poverty rate. Efforts to prevent further increases in the 
size of the government sector could add a quarter of a percentage point to per capita real 
output growth. 
Nigeria’s growth prospects may be dimmed if following past trends the government 
increases its consumption. We estimate that the negative effect of such an increase on growth 
cancels out completely the positive effect of all other reform efforts (Table 8A). If Nigeria 
manages to prevent further increases in the share of government consumption in the country’s 
                                                 
36 Failure to improve infrastructure in China is modeled by assuming that there is no improvement in public 
infrastructure. In this case, the average per capita real GDP growth rate would fall down by 0.89 percentage 
points from 8.76% to 7.91%.   30
GDP its average, annual per capita real growth rate in the period 2005-2014 could increase to 
more than 2 percent, compared to the expected stagnation in real output per capita under the 
continuous trend scenario (Table 8A). 
  In Brazil the greatest growth dividend is expected to come from reducing the 
probability of banking crises, followed by improvements in macro management and cyclical 
output volatility. Mexico is another country where continued progress with stabilization 
policies makes a sizable contribution to growth.
37 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
As mentioned earlier the estimated coefficients in Loayza et al. (2005) (Appendix Table 1) 
are robust to changes in the estimation method. The signs of the coefficients are also robust to 
changes in the time horizon: 30 year averages (pure cross section estimation) vs. 5 year 
averages (dynamic panel estimation). However, there are differences in the size and 
significance of some of the coefficients (Appendix Table 2). Given these differences and the 
fact that the pure cross-section regression resembles most closely the models in the empirical 
literature we test the sensitivity of the growth effects to changes in the time horizon. We 
estimate the growth effects of the forecasted changes in the underlying growth determinants 
using the estimated coefficients from the pure cross country regression (shown in the second 
column of Appendix Table 2) and compare them to the ones obtained using the estimated 
coefficients from the dynamic panel estimation (5-year averages) (shown in the fourth column 
of Appendix Table 2).  
The main conclusions for the relative importance of the growth determinants at the 
regional level and for the developing world as a whole remain unchanged (compare Tables 6 
and 9). Again we find that the largest growth dividend comes from continued improvement in 
                                                 
37 See Loayza et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion of the results on the countries in Latin America and 
Caribbean.   31
public infrastructure, followed by the growth contributions of rising secondary school 
enrollment, financial deepening, and trade openness. The joint contribution of these four 
growth determinants to per capita GDP growth in the next decade is estimated at 1 percentage 
point per year on average. Failure to keep on improving public infrastructure alone could 
reduce this growth dividend by 70%. The growth contribution of public investment is larger 
than the one estimated with the dynamic panel model because of the larger estimated 
coefficient on public investment in the pure cross section model (see Appendix Table 2).  
At the regional level, the forecasted growth rates with the pure cross section model are 
less than half a percentage point away from those obtained with the dynamic panel estimation 
method.
38 There are some differences at the country level, but these are more than one 
percentage point for only 18 of the 55 countries, and are associated with a sign change in only 
3 cases.  
5. Concluding remarks 
The paper presents real per capita GDP growth forecasts for all developing countries for the 
period 2005-2014. For 55 of these countries the paper forecasts the growth effects of the main 
forces underpinning growth assuming that these evolve following past trends. We find that for 
the average developing country the largest growth dividend comes from continued 
improvement in public infrastructure, followed by the growth contributions of rising 
secondary school enrollment, trade openness, and financial deepening. The joint contribution 
of these four policy indicators to average, annual per capita GDP growth in the next decade is 
estimated to be 1 percentage point. Failure to keep on improving public infrastructure alone 
could reduce this growth dividend by 50 percent.  
                                                 
38 East Asia and the Pacific region is an exception with the difference slightly more than half a percentage point 
(0.68).   32
The forecasted growth contributions differ by region and country. For the average 
developing country in East Asia and Latin America the growth effects of improving trade 
openness will be larger than those of financial sector deepening. The reverse is the case in 
South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa. In these three regions, 
efforts to reduce the government burden will be beneficial to growth.  
A number of caveats are important. The linear growth model does not capture policy 
interactions, and does not allow us to sequence policy reforms or identify binding constraints 
to growth. The methodology does not allow us to differentiate among various policy actions 
within each of the four policy areas represented in the growth forecasting model and cannot 
be used to discuss issues of policy effectiveness. The framework is not well suited for 
modeling the impacts of policy reforms – for instance, tariff cuts and deregulation of the 
investment regime.  
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Figure 1. Public investment in human and physical capital in Botswana 
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*PCPHO denotes the number of telephone mainlines per capita – a proxy for public infrastructure. 
Source: Loayze et al. (2005) panel data.   38
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*OPEN denotes trade openness which is defined as the residual of the log of the trade (exports plus imports) to GDP ratio on the logs of area 
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*PCPHO denotes the number of telephone mainlines per capita – a proxy for public infrastructure. 
Source: Loayze et al. (2005) panel data.   39
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*Public education is proxied with the ratio of total secondary enrollment to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to that 
level of education. Public infrastructure is proxied with the number of telephone mainlines per capita. 
 
Source: Loayze et al. (2005) panel data.  40
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*y=Y/AL (output per efficiency unit of labor); k=K/AL (capital per efficiency unit of labor); y
T is trend output; X 
is the set of steady-state determinants, which in the Solow’s model are the rate of saving and the rate of 
population growth, but in general include different structural and stabilization policies and external factors. 
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 Table 1A. Average, annual real per capita GDP growth rates 
Region/Countries  1961-00 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 
Sub-Saharan Africa       
Botswana 6.33  5.42  10.50  6.90  2.48 
Burkina  Faso  1.25 0.91 1.13 0.83 2.12 
Cote  d'Ivoire  0.57 4.57 1.18 -2.94  -0.53 
DRC (Zaire)  -3.35  0.15  -2.38  -2.31  -8.86 
Gambia  0.92 2.29 1.54 -0.15  -0.01 
Ghana  -0.21 0.54 -1.86 -1.30 1.78 
Kenya  1.23 1.16 4.01 0.59 -0.86 
Madagascar -1.11  0.51  -1.58  -2.18  -1.17 
Malawi  1.36 2.10 2.85 -1.01 1.51 
Niger -1.65  0.09  -1.76  -3.27  -1.64 
Nigeria  0.32 1.68 1.73 -1.95  -0.19 
Republic of the Congo  1.33  1.60  3.41  1.81  -1.50 
Senegal  -0.24 -0.77 -1.18 0.26  0.73 
Sierra  Leone  -1.36 2.45 0.30 -1.23 -6.97 
South  Africa  0.88 3.71 1.19 -1.16  -0.23 
Togo  0.86 5.19 1.93 -2.11  -1.58 
Uganda 1.40  0.81  -3.14  4.67  3.26 
Zambia -1.25  0.76  -1.79  -2.01  -1.93 
Zimbabwe 0.71  2.82  -0.15  0.69  -0.53 
Region  0.42 1.89 0.84 -0.31  -0.74 
       
Middle East & North Africa       
Algeria  1.29 1.24 4.24 -0.55 0.13 
Egypt  3.07 2.78 4.21 2.61 2.63 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  1.53  6.19  -2.74  0.85  1.83 
Jordan  0.95 -1.62 6.55 -2.78 1.74 
Morocco  1.86 2.77 1.92 2.60 -0.03 
Syrian  Arab  Rep.  2.16 1.85 6.16 -1.29 1.88 
Tunisia  3.03 3.64 4.34 0.97 3.17 
Region  1.98 2.41 3.53 0.34 1.62 
       
East Asia and Pacific       
China  5.42 1.48 4.22 7.42 8.56 
Indonesia  3.51 1.79 5.25 4.34 2.67 
Papua  New  Guinea  1.30 4.31 0.05 -1.29 2.15 
Philippines  1.16 1.80 3.02 -0.72 0.54 
Thailand  4.51 4.81 3.95 5.82 3.46 
Region  3.18 2.84 3.30 3.11 3.48 
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Table 1B. Average, annual real per capita GDP growth rates 
Region/Countries  1961-00  1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 
South Asia         
Bangladesh 1.36  1.38  -0.99  2.11  2.94 
India  2.30  1.49 0.68 3.51 3.51 
Pakistan  2.62  4.18 1.46 3.43 1.40 
Sri  Lanka  2.88  2.09 2.60 3.03 3.82 
Region  2.29  2.28 0.94 3.02 2.92 
          
Latin America and the Caribbean*     
Antgua and Barbuda  4.09  …  6.93  5.43  1.90 
Argentina 0.95  2.31  1.32  -2.99  3.18 
Bahamas,  The  1.36  3.73 0.70 0.90 0.10 
Barbados  2.55  6.00 2.37 0.82 1.03 
Belize  2.72  2.27 5.07 2.22 1.32 
Bolivia 0.37  0.35  1.67  -1.95  1.40 
Brazil 2.45  3.18  5.75  -0.42  1.27 
Chile  2.5  1.82 1.22 2.08 4.89 
Colombia  1.82  2.21 3.05 1.26 0.74 
Costa Rica  1.87  1.93  2.75  -0.32  3.13 
Dominica 3.08  …  0.60  5.34  1.56 
Dominican  Republic  2.74  2.47 4.17 0.31 4.00 
Ecuador 1.52  1.24  5.65  -0.47  -0.35 
El Salvador  0.73  2.15  -0.18  -1.47  2.40 
Grenada 3.69  …  3.97  5.00  2.29 
Guyana 0.59  1.26  0.66  -3.90  4.34 
Guatemala 1.29  2.56  2.87  -1.62  1.35 
Haiti -0.99  -1.48  2.53  -2.31  -2.70 
Honduras 0.79  1.52  2.06  -0.73  0.31 
Jamaica 0.47  3.33  -2.12  1.24  -0.56 
Mexico 2.11  3.37  3.58  -0.29  1.81 
Nicaragua -0.77  3.36  -2.84  -4.07  0.46 
Peru 0.61  2.31  0.84  -2.99  2.28 
Paraguay 1.62  1.79  5.69  -0.30  -0.69 
Panama 2.02  4.70  1.47  -0.71  2.62 
St. Kitts and Nevis  5.26  …  7.14  5.56  4.40 
St. Lucia  3.29  …  …  5.34  1.24 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  3.68  …  4.49  4.95  2.17 
Suriname 0.95  …  1.81  -1.68  2.90 
Trinidad and Tobago  2.52  3.79  5.13  -1.20  2.35 
Uruguay 1.13  0.36  2.60  -0.66  2.24 
Venezuela, RB  -0.30  1.46  -0.76  -1.75  -0.15 
Region 1.78  2.63  3.46  -0.82  1.75 
Developed  countries  (actual)  2.68  4.28 2.50 2.42 1.68 
Developed  countries  (trend)  2.71  3.85 2.49 2.34 1.80 
World  2.76  4.15 2.68 2.29 1.90 
Source: Authors’ calculations. *The data for the Latin American countries, the averages for the developed countries and the world come 
from Loayza et al. (2005). 
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Table 2A. Volatility of real per capita output 
Region/Countries  1961-00 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 
Sub-Saharan Africa       
Botswana  0.0262 0.0218 0.0298 0.0283 0.0147 
Burkina  Faso  0.0204 0.0182 0.0177 0.0312 0.0123 
Cote  d'Ivoire  0.0300 0.0367 0.0402 0.0345 0.0347 
DRC  (Zaire)  0.0355 0.0537 0.0346 0.0218 0.0302 
Gambia  0.0323 0.0575 0.0249 0.0207 0.0111 
Ghana  0.0289 0.0233 0.0459 0.0273 0.0051 
Kenya  0.0305 0.0465 0.0306 0.0156 0.0138 
Madagascar  0.0220 0.0154 0.0331 0.0221 0.0110 
Malawi  0.0345 0.0447 0.0211 0.0185 0.0373 
Niger  0.0415 0.0265 0.0589 0.0506 0.0267 
Nigeria  0.0368 0.0837 0.0428 0.0299 0.0124 
Republic of the Congo  0.0368  0.0240  0.0484  0.0410  0.0270 
Senegal  0.0277 0.0231 0.0366 0.0348 0.0150 
Sierra  Leone  0.0345 0.0244 0.0145 0.0295 0.0583 
South  Africa  0.0227 0.0155 0.0309 0.0288 0.0111 
Togo  0.0391 0.0316 0.0387 0.0301 0.0560 
Uganda  0.0509 0.0192 0.0913 0.0408 0.0159 
Zambia  0.0300 0.0422 0.0263 0.0209 0.0311 
Zimbabwe  0.0362 0.0350 0.0433 0.0303 0.0391 
Region  0.0324 0.0338 0.0373 0.0293 0.0244 
       
Middle East & North Africa        
Algeria  0.0504 0.0895 0.0496 0.0164 0.0132 
Egypt  0.0189 0.0221 0.0289 0.0132 0.0044 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  0.0469 0.0345 0.0630 0.0604 0.0191 
Jordan  0.0412 0.0411 0.0503 0.0394 0.0347 
Morocco  0.0276 0.0322 0.0186 0.0252 0.0353 
Syrian  Arab  Rep.  0.0481 0.0610 0.0613 0.0451 0.0223 
Tunisia  0.0216 0.0254 0.0259 0.0215 0.0122 
Region  0.0364 0.0437 0.0425 0.0316 0.0202 
       
East Asia       
China  0.0512 0.0941 0.0250 0.0254 0.0163 
Indonesia  0.0258 0.0237 0.0097 0.0150 0.0444 
Papua  New  Guinea  0.0308 0.0178 0.0267 0.0296 0.0442 
Philippines  0.0204 0.0061 0.0110 0.0377 0.0144 
Thailand  0.0234 0.0125 0.0162 0.0158 0.0407 
Region  0.0303 0.0308 0.0177 0.0247 0.0320 
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Table 2B. Volatility of real per capita output 
Region/Countries  1961-00 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 
South Asia       
Bangladesh  0.0294 0.0337 0.0460 0.0096 0.0055 
India  0.0194 0.0239 0.0265 0.0137 0.0114 
Pakistan  0.0137 0.0202 0.0124 0.0066 0.0121 
Sri  Lanka  0.0108 0.0139 0.0120 0.0101 0.0058 
Region  0.0183 0.0229 0.0242 0.0100 0.0087 
       
Latin America & the Caribbean*     
Antgua and Barbuda  0.0211  …  0.0231  0.0231  0.0204 
Argentina  0.0366 0.0350 0.0319 0.0475 0.0306 
Bahamas,  The  0.0475 0.0272 0.0888 0.0306 0.0096 
Barbados  0.0275 0.0299 0.0313 0.0304 0.0185 
Belize  0.0232 0.0063 0.0349 0.0288 0.0143 
Bolivia  0.0217 0.0384 0.0127 0.0147 0.0102 
Brazil  0.0226 0.0163 0.0244 0.0283 0.0162 
Chile  0.0324 0.0161 0.0456 0.0418 0.0196 
Colombia  0.0129 0.0076 0.0137 0.0092 0.0189 
Costa  Rica  0.0205 0.0114 0.0209 0.0244 0.0209 
Dominica  0.0387 … 0.0961  0.0200  0.0124 
Dominican  Republic  0.0319 0.0550 0.0131 0.0271 0.0176 
Ecuador  0.0262 0.0159 0.0366 0.0280 0.0230 
El  Salvador  0.0242 0.0127 0.0330 0.0237 0.0114 
Grenada  0.0223 … 0.0174  0.0177  0.0290 
Guyana  0.0351 0.0454 0.0311 0.0423 0.0199 
Guatemala  0.0129 0.0123 0.0159 0.0149 0.0044 
Haiti  0.0262 0.0255 0.0276 0.0108 0.0372 
Honduras  0.0200 0.0136 0.0300 0.0167 0.0187 
Jamaica  0.0253 0.0200 0.0390 0.0256 0.0086 
Mexico  0.0213 0.0158 0.0174 0.0288 0.0240 
Nicaragua  0.0438 0.0211 0.0828 0.0281 0.0137 
Peru  0.0356 0.0151 0.0185 0.0635 0.0290 
Paraguay  0.0204 0.0109 0.0215 0.0324 0.0118 
Panama  0.0278 0.0084 0.0207 0.0516 0.0121 
St. Kitts and Nevis  0.0263  …  0.0282  0.0331  0.0178 
St.  Lucia  0.0455 …  … 0.0635  0.0150 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  0.0929  0.0384  0.1867  0.0195  0.0258 
Suriname  0.0466 … 0.0318  0.0569  0.0547 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  0.0222 0.0170 0.0264 0.0293 0.0154 
Uruguay  0.0291 0.0190 0.0244 0.0465 0.0226 
Venezuela,  RB  0.0262 0.0205 0.0200 0.0344 0.0278 
Region  0.0302 0.0213 0.0370 0.0310 0.0197 
Developed  countries  0.0133 0.0114 0.0175 0.0126 0.0096 
World  0.0241 0.0233 0.0248 0.0218 0.0186 
Source: Author’s calculations. *The estimates for the Latin American countries, the averages for the developed countries and the world are 
obtained from Loayza et al. (2005).   45
Table 3A. Forecasts of average, annual real per capita GDP growth rates, 2004-2015 
Country/Region Forecast  60% 
Confidence 
Interval*** 
Country/Region Forecast  60% 
Confidence  
Interval 
Sub-Saharan Africa      Middle East and North Africa   
Angola -0.51  -4.28  3.25  Algeria  1.75  0.24  3.25 
Benin  1.45 0.07 2.82  Djibouti  -1.93  -3.57  -0.29 
Botswana  2.76  -1.17  6.69  Egypt, Arab Rep.  2.05  -0.79  4.88 
Burkina  Faso  2.03 0.73 3.34  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  2.16  -2.57 6.88 
Burundi -2.12  -4.25  0.00  Iraq  -3.33  -7.14  0.48 
Cameroon 1.43  -2.31  5.17  Jordan  0.41  -4.26  5.08 
Cape Verde  3.33  -2.24  8.90  Lebanon  0.51  -5.83  6.85 
Central Afr. Republic  -0.64  -3.19  1.92  Libya  0.16  -6.59  6.92 
Chad 3.73  -0.58  8.05  Morocco  0.37  -1.74  2.48 
Comoros -0.44  -2.91  2.04  Oman  1.31  -10.86  13.48 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  -3.96  -8.97  1.05  Syrian Arab Republic  0.97  -1.61  3.55 
Congo, Rep.  1.97  -2.21  6.15  Tunisia  2.80  0.51  5.09 
Cote d'Ivoire  -0.26  -3.30  2.78  West Bank and Gaza -5.39 -9.42 -1.35 
Equatorial Guinea  11.40  4.03  18.78  Yemen, Rep.  0.86  -3.18  4.90 
Eritrea 0.94  -3.10  4.98  Region*  1.17  -4.39  6.72 
Ethiopia  1.60 0.59 2.61  Region**  1.66  -2.05  5.37 
Gabon -0.54  -2.82  1.74        
Gambia, The  0.97  -0.84  2.78  East Asia and Pacific   
Ghana 2.04  -0.44  4.52  American  Samoa  0.52  0.03  1.01 
Guinea 1.00  -1.86  3.87  Cambodia  2.49  -1.54  6.53 
Guinea-Bissau -2.39  -4.89  0.10  China  6.35  3.71  9.00 
Kenya -0.52  -3.68  2.65  Fiji  1.23  -0.29  2.74 
Lesotho 2.75  -1.99  7.50  Indonesia  1.54  -0.60  3.67 
Liberia 12.95  -7.90  33.81  Kiribati  2.28  -0.87  5.44 
Madagascar  -0.53  -2.28  1.22  Korea, Dem. Rep.  -0.99  -1.38  -0.60 
Malawi 1.81  -0.18  3.80  Lao  PDR  3.06  1.41  4.71 
Mali 2.28  -0.20  4.76  Malaysia  2.34  0.33  4.36 
Mauritania 1.74  -1.68  5.16  Marshall  Islands  -2.62  -6.34  1.11 
Mauritius  3.17 2.98 3.35  Micronesia,  Fed.  Sts.  -1.76  -6.80 3.29 
Mayotte 1.15  -3.40  5.70  Mongolia  2.05  -2.79  6.89 
Mozambique 4.11  -1.25  9.46  Myanmar  4.56  1.92  7.19 
Namibia 0.35  -3.80  4.51  N.  Mariana  Islands  0.38  -3.66  4.42 
Niger 0.15  -4.25  4.55  Palau  0.23  -3.81  4.27 
Nigeria 0.35  -4.06  4.77  Papua  New  Guinea  -2.05  -6.76  2.66 
Rwanda 4.49  -1.10  10.07  Philippines  1.09  -0.24  2.43 
Sao Tome and Principe  0.11  -2.37  2.58  Samoa  1.97  -2.07  6.01 
Senegal  1.72 0.75 2.69  Solomon  Islands  -2.04  -6.54 2.46 
Seychelles 1.49  -2.96  5.94  Thailand  1.80  -0.25  3.85 
Sierra  Leone  -4.76 -8.01 -1.51  Timor-Leste  N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Somalia  5.65 4.78 6.52  Tonga  0.80  -0.24 1.84 
South Africa  0.46  -0.83  1.76  Vanuatu  -2.78  -9.98  4.41 
Sudan  3.10 1.20 5.00  Vietnam  4.14  2.16 6.12 
Swaziland 0.12  -4.08  4.33  Region*  1.41  -1.33  4.14 
Tanzania 1.58  -0.44  3.59  Region**  5.41  2.90  7.92 
Togo -0.14  -1.86  1.57        
Uganda 2.87  -0.79  6.52        
Zambia 0.05  -3.17  3.26        
Zimbabwe -1.80  -5.89  2.28        
Region*  1.80  -1.56  5.15      
Region**  1.01  -1.66  3.68      
Source: Authors’ estimates produced with forecasting model (5). *The regional average is computed using weights which represent the share 
of per capita income in the average regional per capita income computed as a simple average and based on data for 2004. **The regional 
average is computed using weights which represent the share of income in the average regional income based on data for 2004.***Note that 
at the regional level the level of confidence depends on assumptions about the joint distribution of individual country outcomes.   46
Table 3B. Forecasts of average, annual real per capita GDP growth rates, 2004-2015 
Country/Region Forecast  60%   
Confidence 
Interval 
Country/Region Forecast  60% 
Confidence  
Interval 
Latin America and Caribbean     Europe and Central Asia    
Antigua and Barbuda  1.57  -2.13  5.27  Albania  4.84  -0.13  9.81 
Argentina 0.29  -2.43  3.01  Armenia  6.14  2.10  10.18 
Barbados 1.70  -1.15  4.54  Azerbaijan  3.67  -0.37  7.71 
Belize -0.81  -5.02  3.40  Belarus  4.71  0.68  8.75 
Bolivia  0.67  -0.73  2.06  Bosnia and     
Brazil 0.94  -1.73  3.61  Herzegovina  12.28  8.24  16.31 
Chile  2.51 1.12 3.90  Bulgaria  1.48  -1.87 4.82 
Colombia 0.04  -1.39  1.47  Croatia  4.06  0.02  8.10 
Costa Rica  3.13  0.49  5.77 Czech  Republic 2.08  -1.96  6.12 
Cuba 2.23  -1.40  5.85  Estonia  5.35  -0.71  11.41 
Dominica 1.28  -0.56  3.13  Georgia  4.31  -6.69  15.31 
Dominican  Republic  2.87 0.18 5.56  Hungary  3.57  2.13 5.02 
Ecuador 0.46  -2.92 3.85  Kazakhstan  3.77 -0.27  7.80 
El Salvador  1.04  -0.94  3.03  Kyrgyz Republic  2.57  -4.18  9.33 
Grenada  2.99 0.13 5.84  Latvia  5.08  -2.11  12.27 
Guatemala 0.71  -0.70  2.11  Lithuania  5.14  1.10  9.18 
Guyana 1.54  -1.06  4.13 Macedonia,  FYR 0.97  -3.07  5.01 
Haiti -1.43  -3.78  0.93  Moldova  0.27  -11.66  12.20 
Honduras 0.04  -2.18  2.26  Poland  3.86  0.08  7.65 
Jamaica -0.41  -2.36  1.54  Romania  1.60  -3.82  7.03 
Mexico 0.93  -0.16  2.01  Russian  Federation  2.37  1.48  3.27 
Nicaragua  -1.05  -5.53  3.44  Serbia & Montenegro  4.30  0.26  8.34 
Panama  2.41 0.55 4.27  Slovak  Republic  3.45  0.03 6.86 
Paraguay -0.72  -3.03  1.59  Tajikistan  1.38  1.18  1.58 
Peru 1.36  -0.39  3.11  Turkey  1.65  0.25  3.06 
St. Kitts and Nevis  2.13  -1.92  6.19  Turkmenistan  3.22  -5.96  12.39 
St. Lucia  0.03  -1.98  2.04  Ukraine  0.90  -3.28  5.07 
St. Vincent and Grenadines  2.82  -2.62  8.26  Uzbekistan  1.05  -0.99  3.09 
Suriname 1.60  -1.51  4.71  Region*  3.65  -0.67  7.97 
Trinidad and Tobago  4.48  1.43  7.53  Region**  2.58  0.05  5.11 
Uruguay 0.31  -1.06  1.68        
Venezuela, RB  -1.58  -4.28  1.11      
Region*  1.49  -1.20  4.18        
Region**  0.88  -1.22  2.98        
            
Developing  world      South  Asia    
 East Asia and Pacific  1.41  -1.33  4.14  Afghanistan 1.13  -4.90  7.16 
  5.41  2.90  7.92  Bangladesh 2.61  0.73  4.49 
 Europe and Central Asia  3.65  -0.67  7.97  Bhutan 3.00  1.34  4.65 
  2.58  0.05  5.11  India 3.50  2.13  4.87 
 Latin America and Caribbean  1.49  -1.20  4.18  Maldives 1.98  -2.05  6.02 
  0.88  -1.22  2.98  Nepal 1.10  0.29  1.91 
 Middle East and North Africa  1.17  -4.39  6.72  Pakistan 1.52  -0.11  3.16 
  1.66  -2.05  5.37  Sri Lanka  2.75  1.06  4.44 
 South Asia  2.38  0.05  4.72  Region*  2.38  0.05  4.72 
  3.25  1.80  4.70  Region**  3.25  1.80  4.70 
 Sub-Saharan Africa  1.80  -1.56  5.15        
  1.01  -1.66  3.68        
Developing world*  2.16  -1.46  5.78        
Developing world**  3.49  1.14  5.85        
*Source: Author’s estimates produced with forecasting model (5). *The regional average is computed using weights which represent the 
share of per capita income in the average regional per capita income computed as a simple average and based on data for 2004. **The 
regional average is computed using weights which represent the share of income in the average regional income based on data for 2004.    47
Table 4. Real GDP per capita, annual average forecasts, 2004-2015 
Region  Forecast  60% Confidence intervals 
 East Asia and Pacific      
         Average*  1.41  -1.33  4.14 
         Average**  5.41  2.90  7.92 
        GEP’s Average***  5.40    
 Europe and Central Asia      
         Average*  3.65  -0.67  7.97 
         Average**  2.58  0.05  5.11 
        GEP’s Average***  3.30    
 Latin America and Caribbean      
         Average*  1.49  -1.20  4.18 
         Average**  0.88  -1.22  2.98 
        GEP’s Average***  2.50    
 Middle East and North Africa      
         Average*  1.17  -4.39  6.72 
         Average**  1.66  -2.05  5.37 
        GEP’s Average***  2.50    
 South Asia      
         Average*  2.38  0.05  4.72 
         Average**  3.25  1.80  4.70 
        GEP’s Average***  4.10    
 Sub-Saharan Africa      
         Average*  1.80  -1.56  5.15 
         Average**  1.01  -1.66  3.68 
        GEP’s Average***  1.60    
Developing world       
         Average*  2.16  -1.46  5.78 
         Average**  3.49  1.14  5.85 
        GEP’s Average***  3.40    
Source: Author’s estimates produced with forecasting model (5) and Global Economic Prospects 2004. *The regional average is computed 
using weights which represent the share of per capita income in the average regional per capita income computed as a simple average and 
based on data for 2004. **The regional average is computed using weights which represent the share of income in the average regional 
income based on data for 2004. ***Global Economic Prospects 2004, Table 1.5, pp.43.    48











Sub-Saharan Africa 1.80  -4.75  8.34 1.72  -6.21  9.65 
Angola  -0.51 -7.87  6.84  0.73 -6.93  8.39 
Benin  1.45 -1.25  4.14  1.32 -2.84  5.49 
Botswana  2.76 -4.91 10.43  2.51 -5.40  10.42 
Burkina  Faso  2.03 -0.52  4.58  1.90 -1.34  5.13 
Burundi  -2.12 -6.27  2.02  -2.10 -7.67  3.46 
Cameroon  1.43 -5.88  8.74  1.32 -6.35  8.98 
Cape  Verde  3.33 -7.54 14.20  3.15 -8.54  14.83 
Central Afr. Republic  -0.64  -5.63  4.36  -0.48  -3.85  2.89 
Chad  3.73 -4.69 12.16  3.30 -5.10  11.70 
Comoros  -0.44 -5.26  4.39  -0.39 -6.72  5.94 
Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  -3.96 -13.74  5.82  -3.66 -12.59  5.26 
Congo, Rep.  1.97  -6.20  10.13  1.94  -12.17  16.06 
Cote  d'Ivoire  -0.26 -6.19  5.67  -0.03 -9.93  9.86 
Equatorial  Guinea  11.40 -3.00 25.80  10.16 -7.93  28.26 
Eritrea  0.94 -6.95  8.82  1.05 -8.58  10.69 
Ethiopia  1.60 -0.37  3.57  1.54 -1.27  4.35 
Gabon  -0.54 -4.99  3.90  -0.47 -6.68  5.75 
Gambia,  The  0.97 -2.56  4.51  0.94 -3.45  5.33 
Ghana  2.04 -2.81  6.89  1.94 -5.09  8.96 
Guinea  1.00 -4.59  6.59  0.99 -4.80  6.78 
Guinea-Bissau  -2.39 -7.27  2.48  -2.22 -8.60  4.17 
Kenya  -0.52 -6.70  5.66  -0.46 -4.45  3.53 
Lesotho  2.75 -6.51 12.02  2.62 -5.49  10.73 
Liberia  12.95 -27.76  53.67  12.67 -36.29  61.64 
Madagascar  -0.53 -3.95  2.89  -0.48 -4.13  3.17 
Malawi  1.81 -2.08  5.69  1.86 -3.91  7.63 
Mali  2.28 -2.57  7.13  2.10 -4.98  9.18 
Mauritania  1.74 -4.94  8.42  1.69 -3.29  6.66 
Mauritius  3.17 2.80 3.53  2.98 1.87  4.08 
Mayotte  1.15 -7.74 10.04  1.19 -7.01  9.39 
Mozambique  4.11 -6.35 14.56  3.83 -7.67  15.33 
Namibia 0.35  -7.76  8.47  0.34  -10.71  11.39 
Niger 0.15  -8.44  8.74  0.14  -10.25  10.53 
Nigeria 0.35  -8.27  8.98  0.20  -12.28  12.68 
Rwanda 4.49  -6.42  15.39  4.32  -12.51  21.15 
Sao Tome and Principe  0.11  -4.72  4.94  0.00  -6.90  6.91 
Senegal  1.72 -0.17  3.61  1.59 -0.97  4.14 
Seychelles 1.49  -7.20  10.18  1.57  -10.40  13.54 
Sierra  Leone  -4.76 -11.11  1.59  -5.15 -13.84  3.53 
Somalia  5.65 3.94 7.36  5.10  -1.02 11.22 
South  Africa  0.46 -2.06  2.99  0.40 -3.29  4.09 
Sudan  3.10  -0.61 6.81  2.90 1.13  4.68 
Swaziland  0.12 -8.09  8.33  0.09 -7.82  7.99 
Tanzania  1.58 -2.36  5.51  1.37 -3.04  5.78 
Togo  -0.14 -3.49  3.21  -0.06 -6.03  5.90 
Uganda  2.87 -4.27 10.00  2.72 -5.29  10.74 
Zambia  0.05 -6.23  6.32  -0.07 -8.25  8.12 
Zimbabwe -1.80  -9.79  6.18  -1.39  -10.44  7.66 
Source: Authors’ estimates produced with forecasting model (5). The regional averages are computed using weights which represent the 
share of per capita income in the average regional per capita income computed as a simple average and based on data for 2004. 
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Middle East & North Africa  1.17  -9.67  12.01  1.06  -11.62  13.74 
Algeria  1.75 -1.19  4.69  1.61 -2.87  6.08 
Djibouti  -1.93 -5.14  1.27  -1.92 -2.20  -1.64 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2.05  -3.48  7.58  1.93  -3.85  7.71 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  2.16 -7.08 11.39  1.92 -9.06  12.90 
Iraq  -3.33 -10.76  4.10  -2.93 -12.55  6.69 
Jordan 0.41  -8.70  9.53  0.34  -10.82  11.50 
Lebanon  0.51 -11.87  12.89  0.43 -18.80  19.66 
Libya  0.16 -13.03  13.36  0.09 -20.64  20.82 
Morocco  0.37 -3.75  4.50  0.28 -5.60  6.16 
Oman  1.31 -22.45  25.07  1.19 -22.22  24.60 
Syrian  Arab  Republic  0.97 -4.07  6.00  0.96 -6.07  7.98 
Tunisia  2.80 -1.67  7.27  2.63 -2.00  7.26 
West Bank and Gaza  -5.39  -13.27 2.50  -4.56 -14.19  5.08 
Yemen,  Rep.  0.86 -7.03  8.74  0.82 -8.81  10.46 
        
East Asia and Pacific  1.41  -3.93  6.74  1.30  -5.43  8.02 
American  Samoa  0.52 -0.43  1.47  0.52 -0.34  1.37 
Cambodia  2.49 -5.39 10.38  2.26 -7.38  11.89 
China  6.35 1.19  11.52  5.95 1.46 10.44 
Fiji  1.23 -1.73  4.19  1.18 -3.64  6.01 
Indonesia  1.54 -2.63  5.71  1.40 -3.77  6.57 
Kiribati  2.28 -3.87  8.44  2.30 -6.75  11.34 
Korea,  Dem.  Rep.  -0.99 -1.75 -0.23  -0.96 -2.92  1.00 
Lao  PDR  3.06 -0.17  6.29  2.84 -0.68  6.36 
Malaysia  2.34 -1.59  6.27  2.20 -3.21  7.61 
Marshall Islands  -2.62  -9.89  4.66  -2.62  -13.78  8.53 
Micronesia,  Fed.  Sts.  -1.76 -11.61  8.10  -1.77 -14.90  11.36 
Mongolia 2.05  -7.39  11.49  1.94  -12.67  16.55 
Myanmar  4.56 -0.59  9.70  4.28 -2.74  11.30 
N.  Mariana  Islands  0.38 -7.50  8.27  0.38 -9.25  10.02 
Palau  0.23 -7.65  8.11  0.21 -9.42  9.85 
Papua  New  Guinea  -2.05 -11.25  7.15  -1.93 -10.58  6.73 
Philippines  1.09 -1.51  3.69  0.99 -1.47  3.44 
Samoa  1.97 -5.91  9.86  1.80 -7.84  11.43 
Solomon  Islands  -2.04 -10.82  6.75  -1.58 -10.30  7.14 
Thailand  1.80 -2.20  5.80  1.58 -4.00  7.16 
Timor-Leste  N.A. N.A. N.A.  N.A. N.A.  N.A. 
Tonga  0.80 -1.24  2.84  0.63 -2.59  3.85 
Vanuatu  -2.78 -16.83  11.26  -2.67 -22.06  16.72 
Vietnam  4.14 0.28 8.01  3.87  -1.46  9.20 
          
South Asia  2.38  -2.18  6.94  2.22  -2.59  7.02 
Afghanistan 1.13  -10.64  12.90  0.73  -6.93  8.39 
Bangladesh  2.61 -1.07  6.28  2.43 -0.15  5.01 
Bhutan  3.00  -0.24 6.23  2.76 0.75  4.76 
India  3.50 0.83 6.17  3.29  -0.03  6.60 
Maldives  1.98 -5.90  9.87  1.85 -7.78  11.49 
Nepal  1.10 -0.48  2.69  1.04 -1.69  3.76 
Pakistan  1.52 -1.66  4.71  1.45 -1.98  4.88 
Sri  Lanka  2.75 -0.56  6.06  2.62 -0.89  6.12 
*Source: Authors’ estimates produced with forecasting model (5). The regional averages are computed using weights which represent the 
share of per capita income in the average regional per capita income computed as a simple average and based on data for 2004.   50











Latin America & Caribbean 1.49  -3.76  6.74  1.44  -5.19  8.07 
Antigua and Barbuda  1.57  -5.65  8.80  1.53  -6.72  9.77 
Argentina  0.29 -5.02  5.60  0.42 -5.48  6.32 
Barbados  1.70 -3.85  7.24  1.69 -5.97  9.36 
Belize -0.81  -9.03  7.41  -1.11  -11.67  9.46 
Bolivia  0.67 -2.05  3.39  0.65 -2.43  3.73 
Brazil  0.94 -4.28  6.16  0.90 -4.18  5.98 
Chile  2.51 -0.20  5.23  2.38 -0.40  5.16 
Colombia  0.04 -2.76  2.84  -0.02 -3.17  3.12 
Costa  Rica  3.13 -2.02  8.28  3.12 -1.92  8.15 
Cuba  2.23 -4.85  9.30  2.08 -7.95  12.11 
Dominica  1.28 -2.32  4.89  1.40 -2.74  5.54 
Dominican  Republic  2.87 -2.38  8.12  2.78 -6.01  11.56 
Ecuador  0.46 -6.15  7.08  0.36 -6.56  7.29 
El  Salvador  1.04 -2.83  4.91  1.03 -4.78  6.85 
Grenada  2.99 -2.58  8.56  2.91 -4.27  10.09 
Guatemala  0.71 -2.03  3.45  0.71 -2.56  3.98 
Guyana  1.54 -3.53  6.60  1.56 -4.27  7.39 
Haiti  -1.43 -6.01  3.16  -1.27 -6.54  3.99 
Honduras  0.04 -4.30  4.37  -0.01 -6.33  6.30 
Jamaica  -0.41 -4.21  3.40  -0.46 -4.66  3.74 
Mexico  0.93 -1.19  3.05  0.89 -2.24  4.02 
Nicaragua  -1.05 -9.81  7.71  -1.07 -8.97  6.82 
Panama  2.41 -1.22  6.04  2.37 -4.46  9.20 
Paraguay  -0.72 -5.23  3.79  -0.62 -4.28  3.04 
Peru  1.36 -2.06  4.77  1.27 -1.64  4.18 
St. Kitts and Nevis  2.13  -5.79  10.05  2.08  -8.13  12.30 
St.  Lucia  0.03 -3.90  3.95  0.09 -5.44  5.61 
St. Vincent & Grenadines  2.82  -7.79  13.43  2.72  -15.08  20.51 
Suriname  1.60 -4.48  7.68  1.46 -4.77  7.70 
Trinidad and Tobago  4.48  -1.48  10.43  4.17  -2.57  10.90 
Uruguay  0.31 -2.36  2.98  0.45 -4.78  5.68 
Venezuela,  RB  -1.58 -6.85  3.68  -1.38 -7.51  4.76 
*Source: Authors’ estimates produced with forecasting model (5).  The regional averages are computed using weights which represent the 
share of per capita income in the average regional per capita income computed as a simple average and based on data for 2004.   51











Europe and Central Asia  3.65  -4.78  12.08  3.31  -7.38  14.01 
Albania 4.84  -4.86  14.54  4.53  -10.26  19.31 
Armenia  6.14 -1.74 14.02  5.57 -4.06  15.21 
Azerbaijan  3.67 -4.22 11.55  3.10 -6.53  12.74 
Belarus  4.71 -3.17 12.60  4.29 -5.34  13.93 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  12.28 4.39  20.16  12.09 2.45 21.72 
Bulgaria 1.48  -5.05  8.00  1.14  -10.63  12.91 
Croatia  4.06 -3.82 11.95  3.83 -5.80  13.47 
Czech Republic  2.08  -5.80 9.97  1.90  -7.74 11.53 
Estonia 5.35  -6.48  17.18  4.92  -14.30  24.13 
Georgia  4.31 -17.16  25.78  3.93 -27.37  35.23 
Hungary  3.57 0.75 6.39  3.35  -2.32  9.02 
Kazakhstan 3.77  -4.12  11.65 3.18  -6.46 12.81 
Kyrgyz  Republic  2.57 -10.61  15.76  2.41 -12.69  17.51 
Latvia 5.08  -8.96  19.12  4.67  -13.76  23.10 
Lithuania  5.14 -2.75 13.02  4.77 -4.87  14.40 
Macedonia, FYR  0.97  -6.91 8.85  0.92  -8.71 10.56 
Moldova  0.27 -23.03  23.56  0.03 -29.73  29.80 
Poland  3.86 -3.53 11.26  3.67 -6.71  14.05 
Romania  1.60 -8.98 12.19  1.34 -4.91  7.59 
Russian  Federation  2.37 0.62 4.12  1.97 0.76  3.18 
Serbia and Montenegro  4.30  -3.58  12.19  4.01  -5.63  13.64 
Slovak Republic  3.45  -3.22  10.11  3.24  -10.22  16.70 
Tajikistan  1.38 1.00 1.77  0.91  -4.46  6.28 
Turkey  1.65  -1.09 4.40  1.54 0.65  2.42 
Turkmenistan 3.22  -14.71  21.14  2.37  -8.60  13.34 
Ukraine  0.90 -7.26  9.05  0.42 -6.60  7.44 
Uzbekistan  1.05 -2.93  5.03  0.92 -6.17  8.01 
          
Regions          
 East Asia and Pacific  1.41 -3.93  6.74  1.30 -5.43  8.02 
 Europe and Central Asia  3.65 -4.78 12.08  3.31 -7.38  14.01 
 Latin America and Caribbean  1.49 -3.76  6.74  1.44 -5.19  8.07 
 Middle East and North Africa  1.17  -9.67  12.01  1.06 -11.62  13.74 
 South Asia  2.38 -2.18  6.94  2.22 -2.59  7.02 
 Sub-Saharan Africa  1.80 -4.75  8.34  1.72 -6.21  9.65 
Developing world  2.16  -4.19  9.23  1.99  -6.69  10.67 
*Source: Authors’ estimates produced with forecasting model (5). The regional averages are computed using weights which represent the 
share of per capita income in the average regional per capita income computed as a simple average and based on data for 2004. 
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Albania  8.07  8.29  8.49  8.43  0.0069  0.0000 
Algeria*  8.51  8.60  8.69  8.70  -0.0018  0.0000 
Angola  7.54  7.61  7.67  7.67  0.0009  0.0000 
Antigua and Barbuda  9.10  9.08  9.07  9.22  -0.0163  0.0003 
Argentina* 9.35  9.22  9.10  9.37  -0.0292  0.0009 
Armenia 7.64  8.05  8.43  8.27  0.0193  0.0004 
Azerbaijan 7.62  8.05  8.44  8.26  0.0222  0.0005 
Bangladesh*  7.22  7.35  7.46  7.46  0.0001  0.0000 
Belarus  8.33  8.56  8.77  8.76  0.0011  0.0000 
Belize 8.41  8.66  8.90  8.73  0.0189  0.0004 
Benin 6.77  6.89  6.99  6.95  0.0059  0.0000 
Bolivia* 7.68  7.70  7.72  7.83  -0.0135  0.0002 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  8.45  8.56  8.67  8.79  -0.0138  0.0002 
Botswana*  8.73  8.89  9.04  9.06  -0.0023  0.0000 
Brazil* 8.80  8.82  8.84  8.95  -0.0121  0.0001 
Bulgaria 8.58  8.82  9.04  8.91  0.0149  0.0002 
Burkina Faso*  6.85  6.93  7.01  7.03  -0.0030  0.0000 
Burundi 6.34  6.30  6.27  6.44  -0.0263  0.0007 
Cambodia  7.35  7.55  7.74  7.68  0.0077  0.0001 
Cameroon  7.41  7.49  7.57  7.59  -0.0031  0.0000 
Cape Verde  8.38  8.48  8.58  8.57  0.0004  0.0000 
Central African Republic  6.96  6.85  6.75  6.95  -0.0288  0.0008 
Chad 6.72  6.96  7.17  7.66  -0.0638  0.0041 
Chile* 9.00  9.09  9.17  9.27  -0.0106  0.0001 
China* 8.11  8.38  8.62  8.53  0.0105  0.0001 
Colombia*  8.63  8.68  8.73  8.79  -0.0074  0.0001 
Comoros 7.37  7.33  7.30  7.45  -0.0204  0.0004 
Congo, Dem. Rep.*  6.58  6.37  6.18  6.48  -0.0454  0.0021 
Congo, Rep.*  6.75  6.71  6.68  6.82  -0.0202  0.0004 
Costa Rica*  9.05  9.02  8.99  9.11  -0.0136  0.0002 
Cote d'Ivoire*  7.33  7.15  6.99  7.21  -0.0311  0.0010 
Croatia  9.00  9.18  9.34  9.33  0.0013  0.0000 
Czech Republic  9.43  9.57  9.70 9.79  -0.0098  0.0001 
Djibouti  7.53  7.53  7.53  7.57  -0.0054  0.0000 
Dominica 8.57  8.46  8.36  8.55  -0.0224  0.0005 
Dominican Republic*  8.59  8.67  8.75  8.82  -0.0085  0.0001 
Ecuador*  8.01  8.07  8.13  8.19  -0.0073  0.0001 
Egypt, Arab Rep.*  8.05  8.14  8.22  8.24  -0.0025  0.0000 
El Salvador*  8.36  8.38  8.39  8.47  -0.0101  0.0001 
Eritrea 6.78  6.72  6.67  6.90  -0.0331  0.0011 
Estonia 9.06  9.36  9.64  9.46  0.0192  0.0004 
Ethiopia 6.40  6.43  6.46  6.62  -0.0242  0.0006 
Fiji 8.47  8.48  8.48  8.64  -0.0177  0.0003 
Gabon 8.62  8.58  8.55  8.73  -0.0217  0.0005 
Gambia, The*  7.33  7.31  7.28  7.53  -0.0328  0.0011   53





























Georgia  7.42  7.71  7.98  7.92  0.0075  0.0001 
Ghana*  7.50  7.57  7.63  7.67  -0.0047  0.0000 
Grenada 8.73  8.76  8.79  8.90  -0.0123  0.0002 
Guatemala* 8.18  8.18  8.19  8.26  -0.0094  0.0001 
Guinea  7.50  7.53  7.55  7.60  -0.0065  0.0000 
Guinea-Bissau 6.54  6.38  6.24  6.50  -0.0410  0.0017 
Guyana 8.24  8.20  8.17  8.29  -0.0146  0.0002 
Haiti* 7.35  7.26  7.18  7.35  -0.0233  0.0005 
Honduras* 7.72  7.75  7.77  7.87  -0.0125  0.0002 
Hungary  9.31  9.45  9.57  9.64  -0.0070  0.0000 
India*  7.69  7.84  7.97  7.97  0.0006  0.0000 
Indonesia*  7.91  7.98  8.05  8.11  -0.0073  0.0001 
Iran, Islamic Rep.*  8.56  8.73  8.89  8.85  0.0045  0.0000 
Jamaica*  8.12  8.20  8.27  8.20  0.0079  0.0001 
Jordan* 8.19  8.23  8.27  8.35  -0.0101  0.0001 
Kazakhstan 8.22  8.65 9.04 8.84  0.0224 0.0005 
Kenya* 6.85  6.80  6.75  6.89  -0.0200  0.0004 
Kyrgyz Republic  7.22  7.31  7.39  7.49  -0.0135  0.0002 
Lao PDR  7.22  7.41  7.58  7.49  0.0118  0.0001 
Latvia  8.79  9.07  9.32  9.32  0.0005  0.0000 
Lebanon  8.28  8.39  8.49  8.50  -0.0010  0.0000 
Lesotho 7.58  7.74  7.88  7.78  0.0127  0.0002 
Lithuania  8.95  9.19  9.41  9.40  0.0012  0.0000 
Macedonia, FYR  8.66  8.68  8.69  8.71  -0.0019  0.0000 
Madagascar* 6.61  6.56  6.51  6.67  -0.0240  0.0006 
Malawi* 6.32  6.29  6.26  6.37  -0.0182  0.0003 
Malaysia  8.94  9.04  9.13  9.11  0.0021  0.0000 
Mali  6.59  6.76  6.92  6.86  0.0088  0.0001 
Mauritania 7.42  7.41  7.39  7.64  -0.0318  0.0010 
Mauritius  9.06  9.19  9.31  9.31  -0.0002  0.0000 
Mexico* 8.96  8.98  9.00  9.11  -0.0124  0.0002 
Moldova 7.08  7.18  7.27  7.39  -0.0163  0.0003 
Mongolia 7.17  7.31  7.44  7.54  -0.0142  0.0002 
Morocco*  8.08  8.16  8.23  8.26  -0.0032  0.0000 
Mozambique  6.70  6.89  7.07  7.04  0.0045  0.0000 
Namibia  8.60  8.62  8.64  8.70  -0.0068  0.0000 
Nepal  7.07  7.12  7.16  7.23  -0.0087  0.0001 
Nicaragua* 7.66  7.69  7.72  8.05  -0.0399  0.0016 
Niger* 6.58  6.58  6.57  6.65  -0.0120  0.0001 
Nigeria*  6.66  6.79  6.91  6.94  -0.0037  0.0000 
Pakistan* 7.44  7.45  7.45  7.62  -0.0229  0.0005 
Panama* 8.66  8.64  8.62  8.82  -0.0236  0.0006 
Papua New Guinea*  7.73  7.69  7.64  7.77  -0.0166  0.0003 
Paraguay* 8.39  8.32  8.26  8.41  -0.0188  0.0004 
Peru* 8.37  8.43  8.48  8.56  -0.0090  0.0001   54





























Philippines*  8.16  8.23  8.30  8.35  -0.0062  0.0000 
Poland  9.07  9.22  9.35  9.39  -0.0033  0.0000 
Romania  8.56  8.75  8.91  8.95  -0.0043  0.0000 
Russian Federation  8.71 8.99  9.23  9.12  0.0127  0.0002 
Rwanda  6.88  7.01  7.12  7.11  0.0012  0.0000 
Samoa  8.38  8.52  8.64  8.57  0.0085  0.0001 
Senegal*  7.19  7.29  7.38  7.39  -0.0012  0.0000 
Seychelles  9.64  9.60  9.56  9.62  -0.0070  0.0000 
Sierra Leone*  6.04 6.18  6.31  6.63  -0.0475  0.0023 
Slovak Republic  9.24  9.37  9.49  9.51  -0.0017  0.0000 
Solomon Islands  7.67 7.26  6.89  7.40  -0.0687  0.0047 
South Africa*  9.06  9.12  9.17  9.25  -0.0080  0.0001 
Sri Lanka*  8.02 8.10  8.17  8.26  -0.0110  0.0001 
St. Kitts and Nevis  9.25  9.31  9.37  9.38  -0.0002  0.0000 
St. Lucia  8.54 8.49  8.45  8.62  -0.0198  0.0004 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  8.61  8.69  8.77  8.72  0.0060  0.0000 
Sudan  7.37  7.48  7.59  7.53  0.0078  0.0001 
Swaziland  8.31 8.32  8.33  8.43  -0.0117  0.0001 
Syrian Arab Republic*  8.04 8.04  8.05  8.20  -0.0192  0.0004 
Tajikistan  6.52 6.88  7.21  7.01  0.0288  0.0008 
Tanzania  6.14  6.27  6.40  6.42  -0.0023  0.0000 
Thailand*  8.65  8.79  8.93  8.93  -0.0005  0.0000 
Togo*  7.25 7.19  7.14  7.37  -0.0314  0.0010 
Tonga  8.55  8.71  8.86  8.81  0.0057  0.0000 
Trinidad and Tobago*  8.94 9.07  9.18  9.31  -0.0134  0.0002 
Tunisia*  8.62  8.73  8.82  8.86  -0.0045  0.0000 
Turkey  8.60 8.68  8.75  8.87  -0.0137  0.0002 
Turkmenistan  7.90 8.54  9.12  8.78  0.0388  0.0015 
Uganda*  7.03  7.15  7.27  7.27  -0.0010  0.0000 
Ukraine  8.17  8.47  8.74  8.67  0.0079  0.0001 
Uruguay*  9.02 8.88  8.75  9.08  -0.0359  0.0013 
Uzbekistan  7.20  7.32  7.43  7.46  -0.0038  0.0000 
Vanuatu  7.91 7.84  7.78  7.89  -0.0146  0.0002 
Venezuela, RB*  8.55 8.36  8.19  8.62  -0.0495  0.0025 
Vietnam  7.47  7.68  7.87  7.83  0.0059  0.0000 
Yemen, Rep.  6.58  6.65  6.72  6.71  0.0006  0.0000 
Zambia*  6.56  6.64  6.72  6.75  -0.0039  0.0000 
Median  8.05  8.16  8.22  8.26  -0.0070  0.0001 
Average**  7.91  7.99  8.08  8.13  -0.0084  0.0004 
Source: Authors’ calculation and forecasts produced with forecasting model (5). The country cases for which forecasting model (5) performs 
no worse than the average are marked in grey. These are countries for which the absolute value of the CFE is smaller or approximately equal 
to the absolute value of the average CFE in Table 6. 
* Indicates that the country belongs to the panel used to estimate forecasting model (5). **This is a simple average.   55
















Sub-Saharan Africa              
Botswana* -4.42  0.65  -1.21  -0.30  1.84  0.24  0.08 
Burkina Faso*  1.29  1.97  -0.15  0.58  1.39  0.70  -0.56 
Cote d'Ivoire  2.40  0.38  0.52  -1.17  0.72  -0.10  0.42 
DRC (Zaire)  -6.55  -1.75  0.41  -0.91  -0.93  -0.40  0.09 
Gambia 0.13  3.22  0.03  0.06  2.53  0.17  0.43 
Ghana*  3.08  3.77  0.23  1.06  0.71  1.27  0.52 
Kenya -1.45  0.98  -0.10  -0.08  0.47  0.21  0.48 
Madagascar  1.01  1.08  0.38  0.53  -0.40  0.38  0.19 
Malawi  2.52  2.27  0.18  0.84  2.16  -0.68  -0.22 
Níger  1.64  0.70  0.58  0.15  -0.62  0.80  -0.21 
Nigeria*  1.76  2.50  0.34  1.44  -0.26  0.39  0.59 
Republic of the Congo  -3.31  0.14  -0.32  -0.45  -0.27  0.60  0.58 
Senegal*  0.47  0.43  -0.05  -0.86  0.91  0.62  -0.20 
Sierra Leone  -5.73  0.52  0.22  -0.76  0.49  -0.45  1.02 
South Africa*  0.94  2.36  0.20  0.20  1.43  0.41  0.12 
Togo  0.53  1.00  0.37  1.13  0.66  -0.88  -0.28 
Uganda* -1.41  -3.00  -0.73  -4.76  1.12  1.17  0.20 
Zambia*  0.08  0.70  0.35  -0.26  1.30  -0.22  -0.47 
Zimbabwe -1.23  0.67  -0.12  -0.60  1.45  0.02  -0.08 
Middle East and North Africa          
Algeria*  -0.05  -0.63  0.04  -0.40  -1.17  -0.89  0.75 
Egypt* -0.58  2.12  -0.50  -0.08  1.67  0.49  0.53 
Iran, Islamic Rep.*  3.16  1.43  0.12  -2.07  1.27  1.49  0.63 
Jordan 2.40  3.86  0.31  2.33  0.99  0.38  -0.15 
Morocco* -1.18  3.92  2.00  0.26  1.75  -0.26  0.17 
Syrian Arab Rep.  3.27  2.66  0.20  1.33  1.00  0.50  -0.37 
Tunisia*  1.98  2.43  -0.19  0.44  1.84  0.25  0.09 
 
East Asia             
China 1.14  3.37  -1.31  1.14  3.06  0.46  0.02 
Indonesia* -1.67  1.40  -0.76  0.24  2.46  -0.67  0.13 
Papua New Guinea  3.44  3.01  0.23  1.91  0.88  -0.36  0.35 
Philippines* 0.72  1.87  0.13  -0.39  1.45  0.58  0.10 
Thailand* -2.35  1.41  -1.02  -0.45  3.47  -0.67  0.08 
              
South Asia             
Bangladesh*  0.83  0.73  -0.37  -0.67  1.60  0.23  -0.06 
India*  -0.01  -0.32  -0.62  -0.94  1.21  0.28  -0.25 
Pakistan -2.03  1.51  -0.60  0.17  1.56  -0.04  0.42 
Sri Lanka  0.79  1.06  -0.53  0.07  0.91  0.08  0.53 
Source: Authors’ calculations.   56
















Latin America and Caribbean*           
Argentina 6.71  4.45  0.15  1.7  1.07  1.71  -0.17 
Bolivia  3.49  2.54  0.11  -0.02  1.34  1.7  -0.59 
Brazil  1.49  1.00  -0.03  0.89  0.88  -0.53  -0.21 
Chile  2.91  2.59  -0.66  0.65  1.67  1.33  -0.40 
Colombia* -0.55  2.11  -0.32  0.15  1.15  1.47  -0.34 
Costa Rica  3.8  1.13  -0.19  0.36  1.11  0.15  -0.31 
Dominican Republic*  3.44  2.42  -0.14  0.46  1.28  0.48  0.34 
Ecuador*  0.04  0.73  0.01  0.2  0.83  0.03  -0.35 
El Salvador  4.14  2.09  -0.05  -0.1  2.21  0.41  -0.38 
Haiti -0.59  2.34  0.49  0.54  2.24  -0.56  -0.37 
Honduras  0.84  0.82  0.04  0.25  0.71  0.16  -0.35 
Jamaica*  -1.86  -1.73  -0.3  -0.88  1.45  -1.3  -0.7 
Mexico  1.72  1.8  0.05  0.19  1.51  0.24  -0.19 
Nicaragua 4.4  1.84  0.67  -0.97  2.56  0.18  -0.6 
Peru 5.32  3.84  0.3  0.28  1.29  2.42  -0.46 
Paraguay -0.3  0.73  -0.02  0.47  1.79  -0.86  -0.65 
Panama 3.51  1.87  0.04  -0.24  0.83  1.66  -0.43 
Trinidad and Tobago  3.28  0.68  0.21  0.01  0.91  0.37  -0.82 
Uruguay  3.36  3.03  -0.2  0.76  1.05  1.78  -0.35 
Venezuela 1.45  -0.39  0.11  0.2  0.67  -0.94  -0.44 
*Results for the countries in Latin America and Caribbean come from Loayza et al. (2004). The cases for which the forecasted changes in 
growth are less than a percentage point away from the actual changes are marked in grey. An asterisk marks all countries for which 
forecasting model (5) performed well out of sample (those cases are also shown in Table 6).  57
Table 8A. Average, annual real per capita GDP growth forecasts and determinants: a decomposition 
     Contributions to Forecasted Change in Growth Rate, from 1995-2004 to 2005-14  
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Sub-Saharan Africa        
Botswana  3.46 4.95 1.49 -0.69 0.73 0.65 0.15 -0.24 -0.08  0.87 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.08
Burkina  Faso  2.40 3.54 1.14 -0.37 -0.69 0.87 0.23 0.01 -0.07  0.70 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.29
Cote  d'Ivoire  -0.89 -1.56 -0.67 0.63 -1.91 0.29 -0.17 0.08 0.09  0.55 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.26
DRC (Zaire)  -4.79 -6.87 -2.08 0.82 -1.31 -0.61 -0.73 0.19 0.09  -0.52 -0.12 0.00 0.24 0.00 -0.12
Gambia  1.06 2.25 1.19 -0.09 -0.58 0.84 0.08 -0.17 0.39  0.64 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03
Ghana  2.33 4.48 2.15 -0.29 -0.22 0.12 0.38 0.03 -0.15  1.96 -0.03 0.00 0.46 0.00 -0.11
Kenya  -0.68 -1.07 -0.39 0.16 -0.47 0.33 0.06 0.03 -0.50  0.26 0.03 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.18
Madagascar -0.68  -0.63  0.05 0.15 -0.01 -0.27 -0.32 0.27 0.09  0.14 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Malawi 1.67  0.89  -0.78 0.14 -2.86 1.98 -0.42 -0.17 0.25  0.25 -0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 -0.10
Niger  0.18 0.58 0.40 -0.03 -0.20 0.28 -0.32 -0.15 0.39  0.22 0.01 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.02
Nigeria 0.77  -0.05  -0.82 -0.41 0.20 0.73 0.09 0.52 -2.17  0.28 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.05
Rep. of the Congo 2.03  -1.77  -3.80 -0.06 -3.80 -0.32 -0.46 -0.09 0.78  0.09 -0.07 0.00 0.20 0.00 -0.06
Senegal  2.08 3.43 1.35 -0.36 -0.21 0.36 -0.01 -0.09 0.41  0.91 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.15
Sierra Leone  -3.67  -1.45  2.22 -1.09 2.87 0.99 -0.31 -0.64 -0.13  0.09 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.29
South  Africa  0.65 1.32 0.67 -0.18 0.04 -0.24 0.41 0.10 0.09  0.23 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.12
Togo -0.35  1.34  1.69 0.21 -0.45 1.12 -0.10 0.19 -0.08  0.62 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.18
Uganda  3.26 4.54 1.28 -0.39 -0.54 1.01 0.31 0.60 0.12  0.28 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.00 -0.35
Zambia  0.36 0.89 0.53 -0.32 -0.30 -0.50 0.25 -0.09 1.40  0.11 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.10
Zimbabwe -2.94  -2.32  0.62 1.13 -1.11 0.27 0.08 0.30 -0.66  0.25 -0.04 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.23
Average*  1.29 2.12 0.83 -0.24 -0.11 0.33 0.15 0.00 0.00  0.56 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.06
Median  0.65 0.89 0.62 -0.09 -0.45 0.33 0.06 0.03 0.09  0.26 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.03
East Asia and Pacific         
China  7.48 8.76 1.28 -1.12 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.49 -0.05  0.85 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.07
Indonesia  1.91 3.59 1.68 -0.38 0.01 0.60 0.06 -0.08 0.48  0.80 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.01
Papua New Guinea  -2.39  0.06  2.45 0.34 0.68 0.57 0.06 0.31 0.35  0.22 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 -0.23
Philippines  1.39 2.63 1.24 -0.30 0.23 0.12 -0.10 0.11 0.06  1.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08
Thailand  2.40 4.58 2.18 -0.61 0.71 0.87 0.31 0.32 -0.11  0.68 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.05
Average*  3.12 4.84 1.73 -0.58 0.44 0.54 0.19 0.27 0.05  0.76 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 -0.04
Median  1.91 3.59 1.68 -0.38 0.37 0.57 0.06 0.31 0.06  0.80 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.05
Middle East & North Africa      
Algeria 2.13  0.84  -1.29 -0.38 -1.09 0.61 -0.39 -0.16 -0.28  0.52 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.15
Egypt  2.36 2.67 0.31 -0.31 -0.36 0.26 0.37 -0.07 0.11  0.69 0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.30
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2.81  2.51  -0.30 -0.66 0.16 0.28 0.07 -0.47 -0.22  0.83 0.05 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.22
Jordan  0.61 1.63 1.02 -0.20 0.09 0.75 0.19 0.00 -0.14  0.62 0.01 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.18
Morocco  0.62 2.50 1.88 -0.25 1.06 0.50 0.22 0.06 -0.08  0.19 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.03
Syrian Arab Rep.  1.00 1.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.18 0.12 -0.22 0.03 -0.09  0.54 -0.02 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.15
Tunisia  3.28 4.79 1.51 -0.47 -0.10 0.58 0.15 0.03 0.27  0.72 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.23
Average*  2.10 2.47 0.37 -0.39 -0.11 0.46 0.04 -0.12 -0.06  0.62 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.06
Median  2.13 2.50 0.31 -0.31 -0.10 0.50 0.15 0.00 -0.09  0.62 0.01 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.15
Source: Authors’ forecasts produced with forecasting model (5) and authors’ forecasts of underlying determinants. *The regional averages are computed using weights which represent the share of per capita 
income in the average regional per capita income computed as a simple average and based on data for 2004.   58
Table 8B. Average, annual real per capita GDP growth forecasts and determinants: a decomposition 
       Contributions to Forecasted Change in Growth Rate, from 1994-2005 to 2004-15 


















































Latin America and the Caribbean                                 
Argentina  -0.06  0.38 0.44 0.36 0.45 0.18 -0.10 0.14 0.20  0.20 -0.03 -0.17 0.38 -0.97 -0.20
Bolivia  0.73 0.76  0.03  -0.06 -0.03 0.19 0.20 -0.09 0.05 0.30 -0.01 -0.06 -0.13 -0.55 0.22
Brazil 1.06  4.52  3.46  -0.11 0.36 0.39 0.09 0.29 -0.08  0.32 0.31 0.23 0.30 1.51 -0.14
Chile 2.87  2.73  -0.14  -0.36 0.32 0.11 0.06 0.20 -0.24  0.40 0.02 -0.24 -0.13 -0.06 -0.22
Columbia  0.21 1.63  1.42  -0.17 0.72 0.01 -0.05 0.12 0.21 0.33 0.05 0.36 -0.05 -0.19 0.08
Costa Rica  3.16  2.20  -0.96  -0.03 -2.15 0.29 0.30 0.31 -0.14  0.24 0.03 0.34 -0.15 0.00 0.00
Dominican Rep. 3.13  0.37  -2.76  -0.26 -0.44 0.27 0.22 -0.01 -1.19  0.36 -0.04 0.09 -0.06 -1.73 0.03
Ecuador 0.75  3.25  2.50  -0.28 0.65 0.61 0.22 -0.01 -0.29  0.45 0.10 0.59 0.30 0.01 0.15
El Salvador 1.07  2.00  0.93  -0.03 -0.02 0.13 0.02 0.55 -0.20  0.44 0.01 0.24 -0.19 0.00 -0.03
Guatemala  0.71  2.37 1.66 0.00 -0.20 1.07 0.13 0.15 -0.13  0.70 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.01
Haiti -1.84  -0.84  1.00  0.42 -1.36 0.47 0.06 -0.15 -0.26 0.29 -0.02 0.91 0.26 -0.01 0.39
Honduras 0.17  1.43  1.26  -0.14 0.50 0.01 0.19 0.32 -0.29  0.28 0.02 0.48 -0.19 0.00 0.08
Jamaica  -0.25 2.10  2.35  -0.15 0.15 0.24 0.05 0.05 -0.23 0.27 0.05 0.15 -0.16 1.74 0.20
Mexico 1.05  3.84  2.79  -0.12 0.70 0.22 -0.29 0.60 -0.12  0.25 0.05 0.53 -0.04 1.11 -0.10
Nicaragua  -0.98 3.24  4.22  -0.07 1.38 0.25 0.02 0.42 -0.07 0.41 0.46 0.38 -0.02 1.25 -0.19
Panama 2.52  1.78  -0.74  -0.11 -0.98 -0.04 0.29 0.02 -0.14  0.14 0.00 0.12 -0.04 0.00 0.00
Paraguay  -0.99  0.04 1.03 0.27 -0.22 0.12 -0.08 -0.42 -0.17  0.22 -0.01 0.10 0.02 1.24 -0.04
Peru 1.60  2.73  1.13  -0.25 0.50 0.12 0.15 0.05 -0.19  0.10 0.06 0.51 0.08 -0.27 0.26
Trinidad &  5.33  5.18  -0.15  -0.86 -0.25 0.01 0.02 0.23 -0.08  0.22 0.00 0.34 -0.01 0.00 0.23
Uruguay  -0.07  0.04 0.11 0.38 0.30 0.00 0.49 0.28 -0.12  0.20 0.05 -0.20 0.20 -1.35 -0.13
Venezuela, RB  -2.15  -1.14  1.01  0.56 0.41 0.54 -0.28 0.09 -0.17  0.04 0.02 -0.36 -0.02 0.30 -0.12
Average* 1.51  2.22  0.71  -0.12 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.19 -0.16  0.28 0.04 0.17 0.02 0.01 -0.01
Median 0.73  2.00  1.01  -0.11 0.30 0.19 0.06 0.14 -0.14  0.28 0.02 0.23 -0.03 0.00 0.00
South Asia                                     
Bangladesh 3.10  5.14  2.04  -0.49 -0.06 1.32 0.32 0.19 -0.09  0.45 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.37
India 4.09  4.90  0.81  -0.59 -0.42 0.30 0.26 0.12 -0.25  1.32 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05
Pakistan  1.73 2.12  0.39  -0.21 -0.07 0.09 0.08 -0.27 0.22 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.16
Sri Lanka  3.12  4.00  0.88  -0.37 -0.10 0.23 0.37 0.18 -0.49  1.18 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.08
Average* 3.14  4.11  0.97  -0.42 -0.18 0.41 0.28 0.08 -0.22  0.93 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.08
Median 3.11  4.45  0.85  -0.43 -0.09 0.26 0.29 0.15 -0.17  0.82 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.11
Average deve-
loping country* 1.81  2.61  0.79  -0.24  0.00 0.31 0.10 0.11  -0.10  0.46 0.03 0.09  0.03  0.01 0.00 
Source: Authors’ forecasts produced with forecasting model (5) and authors’ forecasts of underlying determinants. Forecasts for the countries in Latin America and Caribbean are based on forecasts of the 
underlying determinants from Loayza et al. (2005). *The regional average is computed using weights which represent the share of per capita income in the average regional per capita income computed as a 
simple average and based on data for 2004.  59
Table 9A. Average, annual real per capita GDP growth forecasts and determinants: a decomposition with pure cross section model 
           Contributions to Forecasted Change in Growth Rate, from 1994-2005 to 2004-15 
           Transitional 
Convergence 
Structural Policies  Stabilization 
Policies 





















Africa     
Botswana 3.46  4.16 -3.75 12.07 0.70 -0.95 0.31  0.10 -0.12 -0.07 1.43 0.00
Burkina Faso  2.40  3.56 0.32 6.79 1.16 -0.50 0.41  0.16 0.00 -0.07 1.15 0.00
Cote d'Ivoire  -0.89  1.02 -8.88 10.91 1.91 0.86 0.14  -0.12 0.04 0.09 0.90 0.00
DRC (Zaire) -4.79  -5.29 -14.21 3.64 -0.50 1.12 -0.29  -0.50 0.09 0.08 -0.86 -0.15
Gambia 1.06  2.74 -1.65 7.13 1.68 -0.12 0.40  0.05 -0.09 0.37 1.05 0.02
Ghana 2.33  5.30 -1.73 12.33 2.97 -0.40 0.06  0.26 0.02 -0.14 3.21 -0.03
Kenya -0.68  -0.26 -4.25 3.73 0.42 0.22 0.16  0.04 0.01 -0.47 0.43 0.03
Madagascar -0.68  -0.39 -4.04 3.26 0.29 0.21 -0.13  -0.22 0.14 0.08 0.23 -0.02
Malawi 1.67  3.05 -2.72 8.82 1.38 0.20 0.94  -0.29 -0.08 0.24 0.40 -0.04
Niger 0.18  0.73 -9.66 11.12 0.55 -0.04 0.14  -0.22 -0.08 0.37 0.37 0.01
Nigeria 0.77  -0.78 -13.26 11.70 -1.55 -0.56 0.35  0.06 0.26 -2.04 0.45 -0.06
Republic of the Congo 2.03  2.22 -11.89 16.34 0.19 -0.09 -0.15  -0.32 -0.04 0.73 0.15 -0.08
Senegal 2.08  3.58 1.03 6.14 1.50 -0.49 0.17  -0.01 -0.05 0.38 1.49 0.00
Sierra Leone  -3.67  -5.13 -13.81 3.55 -1.46 -1.48 0.47  -0.21 -0.32 -0.12 0.14 0.06
South Africa  0.65  1.09 -2.60 4.78 0.44 -0.25 -0.12  0.28 0.05 0.09 0.37 0.01
Togo -0.35  1.45 -4.51 7.41 1.80 0.29 0.53  -0.07 0.09 -0.08 1.02 0.01
Uganda 3.26  4.38 -3.64 12.39 1.12 -0.54 0.48  0.21 0.30 0.12 0.46 0.08
Zambia 0.36  1.17 -7.01 9.35 0.81 -0.43 -0.24  0.17 -0.04 1.32 0.17 -0.14
Zimbabwe -2.94  -1.32 -10.37 7.73 1.62 1.55 0.13  0.05 0.15 -0.62 0.40 -0.05
Average* 1.29  2.13 -4.30 8.56 0.84 -0.33 0.16  0.10 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.00
Median 0.65  1.17 -4.25 7.73 0.81 -0.12 0.16  0.04 0.01 0.08 0.43 0.00
East Asia     
China 7.48  7.96 3.47 12.45 0.48 -1.53 0.16  0.22 0.24 -0.05 1.39 0.05
Indonesia 1.91  3.55 -1.63 8.72 1.64 -0.51 0.36  0.04 -0.04 0.45 1.31 0.03
Papua New Guinea  -2.39  -0.78 -9.43 7.87 1.61 0.46 0.27  0.04 0.16 0.33 0.36 0.00
Philippines 1.39  2.73 0.27 5.18 1.34 -0.41 0.06  -0.07 0.05 0.06 1.64 0.00
Thailand 2.40  3.37 -2.21 8.95 0.97 -0.83 0.42  0.21 0.16 -0.11 1.12 0.00
Average* 3.12  4.16 -0.77 9.10 1.05 -0.79 0.27  0.13 0.14 0.05 1.25 0.01
Median 1.91  3.37 -1.63 8.72 1.34 -0.51 0.27  0.04 0.16 0.06 1.31 0.00
Middle East & North Africa     
Algeria 2.13  2.21 -2.27 6.68 0.08 -0.52 0.29  -0.26 -0.08 -0.27 0.85 0.07
Egypt 2.36  3.53 -2.25 9.31 1.17 -0.43 0.12  0.26 -0.03 0.10 1.12 0.02
Iran, Islamic Rep. 2.81  3.07 -7.91 14.05 0.26 -0.89 0.13  0.05 -0.24 -0.21 1.36 0.06
Jordan 0.61  1.72 -9.45 12.88 1.11 -0.27 0.36  0.13 0.00 -0.13 1.01 0.01
Morocco 0.62  0.94 -4.94 6.82 0.32 -0.33 0.24  0.15 0.03 -0.08 0.31 0.00
Syrian Arab Rep. 1.00  1.66 -5.36 8.69 0.66 -0.04 0.06  -0.15 0.01 -0.08 0.89 -0.02
Tunisia 3.28  4.46 -0.17 9.09 1.18 -0.65 0.28  0.10 0.02 0.25 1.17 0.01
Average* 2.10  2.75 -4.41 9.92 0.65 -0.53 0.22  0.03 -0.06 -0.06 1.02 0.03
Median 2.13  2.21 -4.94 9.09 0.66 -0.43 0.24  0.10 0.00 -0.08 1.01 0.01
Source: Authors’ calculations based on pure cross section OLS estimates in Loayza et al. (2005) and authors’ forecasts of underlying determinants. *The regional average is computed using weights which 
represent the share of per capita income in the average regional per capita income computed as a simple average and based on data for 2004.   60
Table 9B. Average, annual real per capita GDP growth forecasts and determinants: a decomposition with pure cross section model 
          Contributions to Forecasted Change in Growth Rate, from 1994-2005 to 2004-15 
          Transitional 
Convergence 
Structural Policies  Stabilization 
Policies 





Confidence Interval  Forecasted 
change 
2005-14 











Latin America and Caribbean                   
Argentina  -0.06  0.99  -4.91  6.89  1.05 0.49 0.09  -0.07  0.07  0.19 0.33 -0.04 
Bolivia  0.73  1.35  -1.73  4.43  0.62 -0.08 0.09  0.14  -0.05  0.05 0.49 -0.01 
Brazil  1.06  2.13  -2.95  7.21  1.07 -0.16 0.19  0.06  0.15  -0.08 0.52 0.39 
Chile  2.87  3.03  0.25  5.80  0.16 -0.49 0.05  0.04  0.10  -0.23 0.65 0.03 
Colombia  0.21  0.80  -2.34  3.95  0.59 -0.24 0.00  -0.03  0.06  0.20 0.54 0.06 
Costa  Rica  3.16  3.91  -1.13  8.95  0.75 -0.05 0.14  0.20  0.16  -0.13 0.39 0.04 
Dominican  Republic  3.13  2.46  -6.32  11.25  -0.67 -0.36 0.13  0.15  -0.01  -1.12 0.59 -0.05 
Ecuador  0.75  1.39  -5.53  8.31  0.64 -0.38 0.29  0.15  -0.01  -0.27 0.74 0.13 
El  Salvador  1.07  1.93  -3.88  7.74  0.86 -0.03 0.06  0.01  0.28  -0.19 0.72 0.01 
Guatemala 0.71  2.37  -0.90 5.64 1.66 0.00 0.51 0.09  0.08 -0.13 1.14 -0.03
Haiti -1.84  -0.88  -6.14 4.38 0.96 0.57 0.22 0.04 -0.08 -0.24 0.47 -0.03
Honduras 0.17  0.49  -5.83 6.80 0.32 -0.19 0.00 0.13  0.16 -0.27 0.46 0.03
Jamaica -0.25  0.00  -4.20 4.20 0.25 -0.21 0.11 0.03  0.03 -0.22 0.44 0.06
Mexico 1.05  1.46  -1.67 4.59 0.41 -0.16 0.10 -0.20  0.30 -0.11 0.41 0.06
Nicaragua -0.98  0.44  -7.45 8.34 1.42 -0.10 0.12 0.01  0.21 -0.07 0.67 0.58
Panama 2.52  2.66  -4.17 9.49 0.14 -0.15 -0.02 0.20  0.01 -0.13 0.23 0.00
Paraguay -0.99  -0.65  -4.30 3.01 0.34 0.37 0.06 -0.05  -0.21 -0.16 0.36 -0.01
Peru 1.60  1.51  -1.40 4.42 -0.09 -0.34 0.06 0.10  0.03 -0.18 0.16 0.08
Trinidad & Tobago 5.33  4.58  -2.15 11.31 -0.75 -1.17 0.00 0.01  0.12 -0.08 0.36 0.00
Uruguay -0.07  1.20  -4.03 6.43 1.27 0.52 0.00 0.33  0.14 -0.11 0.33 0.06
Venezuela, RB  -2.15  -1.34  -7.47 4.79 0.81 0.77 0.26 -0.19  0.05 -0.16 0.07 0.03
Average* 1.51  1.95  -3.16 7.07 0.44 -0.16 0.10 0.05  0.09 -0.15 0.46 0.05
Median 0.73  1.39  -4.03 6.43 0.62 -0.15 0.09 0.04  0.07 -0.13 0.46 0.03
      
South Asia        
Bangladesh 3.10  4.05  1.47 6.63 0.95 -0.67 0.63 0.22  0.09 -0.08 0.74 0.02
India 4.09  5.58  2.26 8.90 1.49 -0.80 0.14 0.18  0.06 -0.23 2.16 -0.01
Pakistan 1.73  2.10  -1.33 5.53 0.37 -0.28 0.04 0.05  -0.13 0.21 0.48 0.00
Sri Lanka  3.12  4.50  1.00 8.01 1.38 -0.51 0.11 0.25  0.09 -0.47 1.93 -0.03
Average* 3.14  4.30  1.02 7.57 1.16 -0.58 0.20 0.19  0.04 -0.21 1.53 -0.01
Median 3.11  4.28  1.24 7.32 1.17 -0.59 0.13 0.20  0.07 -0.16 1.33 -0.01
Average developing 
country*  1.81  2.45  -3.10  8.01  0.64 -0.33 0.15  0.07  0.06  -0.09 0.76 0.03 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on pure cross section OLS estimates in Loayza et al. (2005) and authors’ forecasts of underlying determinants. *The regional average is computed using weights which 
represent the share of per capita income in the average regional per capita income computed as a simple average and based on data for 2004.  61
Appendix 
Appendix Table 1. Economic growth regressions: various estimation methods 
Estimation period    1966-99 
Time Horizon:    5-year periods 
Type of Model:    Pooled  Within  Levels - IV  System - IV 
Estimation Technique:    OLS  OLS  GMM  GMM 
Instruments:    -  -  Lagged Levels  Lagged Levels/Difference 
      [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
Transitional  Convergence:         
Initial GDP per Capita    -0.0139  -0.0516  -0.0169  -0.0176 
(in logs)    -3.49  -7.51  -5.37  -3.80 
Cyclical Reversion:           
Initial Output Gap    -0.2834 -0.1614  -0.2528  -0.2371 
(log[actual GDP/potentialGDP])    -6.13  -4.33  -7.9  -8.52 
Structural Policies and Institutions:           
Education   0.0085  0.0036  0.0043  0.0172 
(secondary enrollment, in logs)    2.52  0.63  1.42  6.7 
Financial Depth    0.0031  0.005  0.0025  0.0066 
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs)    1.57  1.69  1.91  4.28 
Trade Openness    0.0083  0.0215  0.0115  0.0096 
(structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs)   2.67  4.16  3.45  3.14 
Government Burden    -0.0125  -0.021  -0.0077  -0.0154 
(government consumption/GDP, in logs)    -3.16  -3.37  -2.33  -3.18 
Public Infrastructure    0.0073  0.0067  0.0151  0.0071 
(Main telephone lines per capita, in logs)    3.08  1.6  5.65  2.71 
Governance   0.0012  0.0017  -0.0052  -0.0012 
(1st principal component of ICRG indicators)    1.02  0.93  -3.27  -0.68 
Stabilization Policies:           
Lack of Price Stability    -0.0085 -0.0083  -0.0097  -0.0048 
(inflation rate, in log [100+inf rate])    -2.61  -2.64  -2.88  -1.89 
Cyclical Volatility:    -0.3069  -0.1904  -0.529  -0.2771 
(Std. Dev. of output gap)    -3.58  -2.46  -4.55  -3.76 
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation   -0.008 -0.007  -0.0076  -0.0061 
(in logs; index is proportional, overvaluation if >100)  -2.71  -2.01  -2.82  -3.9 
Systemic Banking Crises    -0.0171  -0.0201  -0.0142  -0.0289 
(frequency of years under crises: 0-1)    -3.96  -4.95  -2.73  -7.42 
External Conditions:           
Terms of Trade Shocks    0.0619  0.0498  0.0533  0.072 
(growth rate of TOT)    2.34  2.27  4.26  4.98 
Period Shifts           
(benchmark for cols. 1 and 3: 1971-75;  71-75:        -0.0090** 
benchmark for cols. 4: 1966-70;  76-80:  0.0017  0.0010       -0.0008  -0.0092** 
benchmark for cols. 2: average 1971-99;  81-85:  -0.0147**  0.0072*  -0.0188**  -0.0238** 
 86-90:  -0.0110**  -0.0031  -0.0160**  -0.0194** 
 91-95:  -0.0158**  0.0038  -0.0226**  -0.0258** 
 96-99:  -0.0168**  0.0002  -0.0222**  -0.027** 
Intercept   0.1418  0.0007  4:12  0.1216 
   4.12  0.15  4.91  2.79 
No. of Countries/No. of Observations   78/350  78/350  78/350  78/350 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)           
(a) Sargan Test:        0.374  0.996 
(b) Serial Correlation           
     First Order    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
     Second Order    0.021  0.617  0.002  0.461 
Notes : For period shifts : ** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%;  Source: Loayza et al. (2005).  62




Section  Confidence Interval   
1966 – 99 
Dynamic Panel 
Confidence Interval 
Time Horizon:  30-year period (±σ)*   5-year  periods 
Type of Model:  OLS      System - IV 
(±σ)  
 






 Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP 
(t-statistics are presented below the corresponding 
ffi i )
[1]  [2]      [3]  [4] 
   
Transitional Convergence:          
Initial GDP per Capita  (in logs) -0.024 (-0.0278, -0.0202) -0.0176  (-0.0222, -0.0130)
 -6.34      -3.8   
Cyclical Reversion:          
Initial Output Gap  (log[actual GDP/potential GDP]) -0.2371  (-0.2649,-0.2093)
  -8.52 
Structural Policies and Institutions:        
Education 0.0082 (0.0044, 0.0120) 0.0172  (0.0146, 0.0198)
(secondary enrollment, in logs)  2.14 6.7 
Financial Depth 0.0045 (0.0016, 0.0074) 0.0066  (0.0051, 0.0081)
(private domestic credit/GDP, in logs)  1.56 4.28 
Trade Openness 0.0048 (0.0009, 0.0088) 0.0096  (0.0065, 0.0127)
(structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs)  1.24 3.14 
Government Burden  -0.0145 (-0.0196, -0.0094) -0.0154  (-0.0202, -0.0106)
(government consumption/GDP, in logs)  -2.82 -3.18 
Public Infrastructure  0.0116 (0.0090, 0.0142) 0.0071  (0.0045, 0.0097)
(Main telephone lines per capita, in logs)  4.46 2.71 
Governance 0.0018 (0.0002, 0.0034) -0.0012  (-0.0030, 0.0006)
(1st principal component of ICRG indicators)  1.15 -0.68 
Stabilization Policies:          
Lack of Price Stability -0.006 (-0.0088, -0.0032) -0.0048  (-0.0073, -0.0023)
(inflation rate, in log [100+inf rate])  -2.11 -1.89 
Cyclical Volatility:  -0.2771  (-0.3508, -0.2034)
(Std. Dev. of output gap)  -3.76 
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation  -0.0061  (-0.0077, -0.0045)
(in logs; index is proportional, overvaluation if >100)  -3.9 
Systemic Banking Crises  -0.0289  (-0.0328, -0.0250)
(frequency of years under crises: 0-1)  -7.42 
External Conditions:           
Terms of Trade Shocks  0.072  (0.0575, 0.0865)
(growth rate of TOT)   4.98 
Period Shifts  71-75: -0.0090 ** 
(benchmark for col. 2: 1960s)  76-80: -0.0092 ** 
(benchmark for col. 3: 1966-70)  81-85: -0.0238 ** 
  86-90: -0.0194 ** 
  91-95: -0.0258 ** 
  96-99: -0.0270 ** 
Intercept 0.2150 (0.1797, 0.2503) 0.1216  (0.0780, 0.1652)
 6.09 2.79 
No. of Countries/No. of Observations  70/70      78/350   
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)  
(a) Sargan Test:  0.996 
(b) Serial Correlation   
     First Order   
     Second Order  0.461 
Source: Loayza et al. (2005). 
*σ denotes standard deviation. 